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Front cover picture: Two cranes standing for many years at the site of a paralysed project at the intersection between “Revolution 
Road’ and the “Thieves Market’ in Damascus, one of many projects that has stalled as a result of poor governance and 
complicated planning regulations.
This site is a microcosm of the political economy in Syria, where new conflict elites seize the opportunities offered by the 
regime and war conditions after the revolution in 2011. Here the thieves meet the revolution; and here Syria continues to await 
reconstruction. Photo credit: Tarek Kebaisy.
About the Conflict Research Programme at LSE
The Conflict Research Programme aims to understand why contemporary violence is so difficult to end 
and to analyse the underlying political economy of violence with a view to informing policy. Our research 
sites are Iraq, Syria, South Sudan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The Syria Conflict Research Programme focuses on five interrelated research topics. The function 
and legitimacy of public authority, identity politics, economic drivers of the conflict, civicness and 
reconstruction. The programme uses a mixed methodology using primary and secondary sources.  
The programme collaborates with the Middle East based Governance and Development Research Centre.
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Preface
In December 2018, we held the “Political Economy and 
Governance in Syria” conference at the London School 
of Economics and Political Science (LSE). We aimed to 
bring together speakers who could help put together the 
jigsaw pieces of Syria’s current landscape in Syria as it 
is, and not as they wish to see it. The resulting picture is 
grim but anchored in the realities needed to guide any 
successful policy or strategy. And despite the gloomy 
picture, there are also opportunities and hope. 
The positive feedback we received about the conference 
motivated us to produce this report. In it, we did our best 
to convey the content of each presentation, through the 
speakers’ materials or through our own summary. We 
also tried to capture the rich debates that took place in 
the question and answer sessions.
The extreme violence that dominated the scene in Syria 
over the last eight years shifted attention away from the 
deep structural transformations affecting the country’s 
economy and governance structures. Now that violence 
has considerably subsided, these are becoming more 
visible. In government-controlled areas, where violence 
has subsided the most, we can now more clearly 
observe the substantial transformations underpinning 
this new reality. Even so, it is too early to speak about a 
post-conflict period. In the northwest and northeast of 
the country, the future is more ambiguous and there is 
still uncertainty on whether it will be resolved through 
peaceful means.
Some of the most important transformations to the 
economy continued pre-conflict trends, which the 
war coloured and exacerbated. In his presentation, 
Dr Abboud stressed that experts and academics 
“warned about these transformations years ago, but 
not much attention was paid to this by policymakers”. 
As an example, he elaborated on the shift from the 
Social Market Economy to the National Partnership 
that led to the privatisation of public resources. After 
2011, this became the primary means by which to 
attract capital for reconstruction and the medium that 
brought the emergence of a new business class that 
initially played an intermediary role, monopolising the 
import or smuggling of goods to regime areas. Its role, 
however, later transformed into a more productive one, 
mainly anchored in the reconstruction economy. The 
emergence of conflict elites and the transformation of 
the Syrian business community during the conflict was 
accelerated, according to Dr Abboud, by three broad 
changes: economic contraction, international sanctions 
and capital flight.
Similarly, Dr Haddad focused on this new layer of 
business elites, with attention to their future economic 
and social roles. He links these transformations to 
changes in the external backers of the regime and to the 
different positions of the external backers of the regime 
and the armed groups: “regime allies saw the conflict in 
existential terms, and acted upon these terms, [while] 
most of the supporters of armed rebels saw the conflict 
in strategic terms, and did not have the stomach or the 
interest to ever go all the way”. He warns that, “If either 
the regime or the values of the dominant global political 
economic order have their way, unfettered, we are likely 
to see the reproduction of power relations, cronyism, 
and subsequent inequitable and/or exploitative 
outcomes that will reproduce the conditions that 
spurred the Syrian uprising in the first place”.
Another relevant transformation is that of property rights 
and ownership. Dr Hallaj points out in his presentation 
that while law 10 is worrying, it only supplements current 
laws that are changing the landscape of housing, land 
and property (HLP) rights in Syria. He suggests that 
women will be disproportionately affected by this 
process because of the unfair and gendered nature of 
inheritance law in Syria, and stresses that the overall 
framework of land and housing management policies in 
Syria should be reviewed.
The second chapter presents private sector alternatives 
to the new conflict elites. Mr Chamsi-Pasha highlights 
the significant role that the diasporic business 
community could play. With assets estimated to be 
worth about $200 billion, this community does not need 
money to play a role in reconstruction and economic 
revival. Instead it requires security, the rule of law and 
the upholding of HLP rights, and the lifting of economic 
sanctions, which serve to restrict capital flow, as well 
as economic support from the international community 
such as credit guarantees and access to markets. 
Small and medium businesses also emerge as a source 
of hope, especially since they generally remained 
distant from the corrupt power structure, dominated 
by large businesses. With the right support, they hold 
the potential to revive the legitimate local economy, 
therefore providing new jobs and breaking people’s 
dependence on aid, and can play a role in the country’s 
reconstruction. Unfortunately, as explained by the panel 
of Syria businessmen, this sector suffered severely 
during the conflict. Crippled by war, sanctions and 
bureaucratically incarcerating regulations, many SMEs 
have either perished or struggle to survive. Those trying 
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to resurrect their business, as in the case study of Mr 
Fahed’s factory in Homs, are left to struggle alone with 
the rigid rules, lack of loans and financing facilities, and 
a poorly functioning market.
The chapter on reconstruction and conditionality 
addresses the challenges posed by Syria’s new political 
economy and power hierarchy, especially the way in 
which its funding is conditioned by international donors. 
Professor Hinnebusch sets out the political context 
behind reconstruction in Syria, drawing attention to 
the asymmetry that exists between the geopolitical 
and geo-economic powers in Syria where “geo-political 
powers, such as the Iranian-Russian coalition, have 
a superior political advantage but fewer economic 
resources. And those that have geo-economic power 
lack the political leverage”. Complementing the debate 
on reconstruction, Dr Imady argues that global actors 
and corporations treat reconstruction “as though it 
was a guaranteed product that can be delivered, if only 
conditions can be met and the resources to pay the 
bill secured”. Presentations on donor conditionality 
discuss how such a simple framework for conditionality 
is not only impractical but also risks delivering adverse 
outcomes. Dr Dahi calls for conditionality to extend 
to new areas and levels, such as local processes and 
initiatives, in a way “that can enable and further justice, 
accountability, equality, voice and representation for all 
Syrians, regardless of political perspective or declared 
loyalty”. He suggests that broad-based economic 
sanctions must also be reconsidered within a new 
conditionality framework because they currently “only 
serve a punitive purpose, but against the wrong people” 
and “empower the well-connected while others suffer”.
The transformations highlighted in the governance 
and civil society chapter complement the picture that 
emerges from the first chapter. Over the course of the 
conflict, major governance structures collapsed while 
others have emerged. Amid the erosion of central 
authority, attempts have been made by several actors 
to reconstruct legitimacy. Some have strived to attain 
communal legitimacy by providing vital public services. 
For example, health sector governance in opposition-
controlled areas has succeeded in constructing 
bottom-up institutional legitimacy, which has enabled it 
to counter the abusive practices and encroachments of 
extremist factions in the area. Others have attempted 
to construct this legitimacy by manipulating and 
hyperbolising confessional and sub-state identities such 
as tribal and ethno-sectarian ones.
The panel discussion on decentralisation, on the other 
hand, highlights the risks that regional-based and 
identity-based decentralisation models could bring by 
empowering such exclusionary and socially divisive 
identities. Attempts to reconstruct legitimacy through 
local elections have not succeeded in every area. It 
would require changes that surpass changing the legal 
system, namely by addressing the public’s scepticism 
and deep-seated lack of trust in the system, addressing 
the political economy of the elections.
Presentations on civil society provide some hope. 
Syrian civil society is playing a progressive role at a 
grassroots level. Through lobbying and advocacy, civil 
society members have also become influential actors 
in the track one Geneva process, as the panel on the 
Syrian Civil Society Support Room suggests. And, 
even amidst a polarised Kurdish political landscape, Dr 
Hassan notes that independent figures from Kurdish 
civil society organisations are putting forward demands 
that better reflect the aspirations of Kurds in Syria, who 
have suffered from decades of marginalisation and 
deprivation of their basic rights.   
Despite the diversity of topics and speakers in the 
conference, one theme commonly emerges. Namely, 
that ordinary Syrians are either invisible or “extras in 
a theatre of continuous power plays”, although it is 
the grievances of those people, caused by decades of 
injustices and authoritarian rule, that motivated Syria’s 
mass movement in 2011. To bring those people to the 
centre of the solution, as Professor Kaldor suggests in 
her closing remarks, the international community must 
adopt a whole-of-society approach in its attempts to 
bring peace back to Syria. This would require a closer 
look at local processes and the inclusion of local 
actors (such as social society and small and medium 
businesses) to reverse the current order, and requires 
connecting and aligning bottom-up efforts to the 
top-level initiatives. Her remarks echo those of several 
presenters; that it is essential to get the framing of this 
conflict, as it started, correct. It is not a conflict between 
armed actors and the regime but a conflict between 
authoritarian rule and the mass Syrian populace, who 
have strived and still strive for their rights. 
We hope to contribute, through the conference and this 
corresponding report, to a better understanding of the 
conflict in Syria, the current political economy landscape 
and the changing configuration of power relations. 
We also hope that such understanding will materialise 
in better and more nuanced policies, solutions, and 
interventions with regards to Syria.
The editorial team 
Dr Rim Turkmani 
Marika Theros 
Sami Hadaya
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Conference opening speech from DFID
Dr David Hallam is Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID). Prior to that he was the UK Envoy for the Post-2015 
Development Goals, as well as leading DFID’s International Relations Division. Previously he had 
led a team supporting the British Prime Minister in his role as co-Chair of the High-Level Panel 
on the post-2015 Development Agenda. His earlier career included leading on DFID’s relations 
with the UN and Commonwealth, and postings to Jerusalem, where he headed the UK’s aid 
programme to Nairobi, and to the Palestinian people. He holds a PhD and a first class honours 
degree in Environmental Sciences from the University of East Anglia.
The United Kingdom has provided humanitarian support 
since the start of the Syria crisis. We committed £2.71 
billion to the response and have already spent 81 per 
cent of this. Eight years into this horrendous conflict, this 
conference is a valuable opportunity to take stock of how 
the context in Syria has evolved, how it will change, and 
how together the international community can respond. 
The UK government will continue to support Syrians to 
find an inclusive political settlement that will bring this 
conflict to an end and pave the way to a better future for 
the Syrian people.
This conference is a great opportunity to build networks, 
share expertise and work together to work out how 
to help the Syrian people. The UK government is clear 
that we must demonstrate how we are using rigorous 
evidence to underpin our aid budget spending decisions. 
And I am proud that evidence has helped to improve the 
effectiveness and the value for money of our work.
One recent example is a study into the deliberate targeting 
of health workers inside Syria, sadly something all too 
common in this conflict. Using the evidence from this 
research we have been able to develop an online portal for 
recording attacks on health workers and facilities. It helped 
us communicate the importance of protecting health 
workers, a first step in preventing attacks. There is possibly 
more information on the Syrian conflict than on any other 
conflict in history, but much of this information is unreliable. 
I recognise that harvesting information and turning it into 
evidence is a massive challenge, particularly in a conflict 
like Syria, an active violent conflict with complex regional 
dynamics, where we have limited access on the ground. 
That is why we rely on the wealth of expertise in this room.
My team faces the additional complexity of working 
without direct presence on the ground. We want to ensure 
we are not supporting programmes or making policies 
while being unaware of, or naive to, the context and the 
views of the Syrian people. But we are reliant on your help in 
doing this. For example this project’s findings have helped 
us to better understand how local governance works in 
different parts of Syria. Your understanding of the context 
and your challenges to our assumptions are vital to our 
continued understanding of how the conflict is changing 
and to help us plan our interventions. 
From the session on governance and local elections at the Political economy and 
governance in Syria conference in December 2018.
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Chapter 1: The reordering of the Syrian  
political economy
From the Social Market Economy to the National Partnership: The conflict 
elite and public-private partnerships in post-war Syria
By Dr Samer Abboud
Dr Samer Abboud is an Associate Professor of Global Interdisciplinary Studies at Villanova 
University and the author of Syria (Polity, 2018). He is also currently the Co-Coordinator of  
the Beirut School of Critical Security Studies Collective, a working group of the Arab Council  
for the Social Sciences.
The current state of the Syrian conflict has turned our 
collective attention to questions of reconstruction, 
despite the absence of a formalised peace process 
or political negotiations. The Syrian post-war order 
is not being shaped by a liberal peace imposed from 
the outside by multilateral powers, nor a negotiated 
peace that emerged from within the country through 
negotiations between various factions. Instead, what 
is emerging in Syria – drawing from the work of David 
Lewis – is an “authoritarian peace” in which perpetual 
violence, the persistence of enmity, and forms of social 
and political erasure underpin the post-war order. 
It is through this interpretative framework, and its 
materialisation on the ground, that I believe we need to 
think about Syria’s current and future political economy. 
This article is intended to show a specific trajectory 
in relation to the conflict and to demonstrate how the 
policies of the 2000s laid the groundwork for a sliver 
of the reconstruction approach that is manifest in 
Syria today. As far as anyone can tell, in the absence 
of a blueprint or a masterplan for reconstruction, the 
main approach to reconstruction in Syria is not based 
on specific policies, or on institutional development, or 
even on relying on privileging some sectors over others. 
Rather it is an approach that centralises public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) as the core mechanism through 
which to attract capital and to achieve reconstruction 
ends. The groundwork for such an approach was laid 
prior to the conflict. As I claim through this article, the 
PPP strategy allows for the transition of a new stratum 
of the business community that emerged after 2011 to 
transition away from being intermediaries in a conflict 
economy to playing more productive roles. So, while I 
trace this shift from the Social Market Economy to the 
National Partnership, I am simultaneously tracing the 
ways in which a conflict elite has emerged in relation 
to violence, and how it is being integrated into the 
emerging reconstruction strategies of the regime. 
I will first briefly take us through the two economic 
strategies, then discuss the processes that have 
given rise to a new conflict elite whose central 
role emerged out of the need for distributive and 
financial intermediation. I conclude by bringing these 
discussions together. 
I want to stress that when I talk about the Social 
Market Economy and the National Partnership, I am not 
taking them as a coherent set of policies but as a kind 
of political rationality; as a way of talking about and 
thinking about the economy. 
The Social Market Economy was a strategy promulgated 
at the 10th al-Ba’ath Party Regional Conference in 2005. 
It gave a name to liberalising measures that had begun 
much earlier, in the 1986 and the 1990s, and were 
accelerated in the early 2000s. The Syrian approach 
to liberalisation and privatisation, however, was not 
premised on the transfer of assets from the public to 
the private sector, but, rather, through the expansion of 
markets to facilitate the entry of private capital into the 
economy. Thus, for example, banks were not sold off, but 
rules were relaxed so that private banks could operate in 
the country. The same could be said in most areas of the 
economy, from insurance to higher education, that were 
effectively marketised rather than privatised. In theory, 
the public sector would continue to operate alongside 
an expanding private sector made up of diasporic and 
national Syrians as well as regional private actors. The 
strategy sought to link Syria to the flowing circuits of Gulf 
and Eastern capital that were being invested in growing 
numbers during the 2000s. The state was imagined 
as a protector of society from the negative costs of 
marketisation, hence the marshalling of the social label. 
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The policies of the 2000s created new elements within 
the business class and provided new opportunities for 
the expansion and wealth accumulation of the networks 
Dr Bassam Haddad talks about in Business Networks 
in Syria. Of interest are the developments in the latter 
part of the decade, when two holding companies were 
created, Cham and Souria. Like the Chambers, they 
represented an institutionalisation of a certain kind of 
business interest, an amalgamation of interests, assets 
and power. Many people believed that these companies 
were politically relevant but economically irrelevant; 
that is that they were small at that time and were not 
doing very much. Today, I believe that the situation has 
changed and that they are relevant in both ways. 
Interestingly, when the holding companies were started 
they were limited in their activities but soon, prior 
to the outbreak of conflict, they were swallowing up 
major government contracts, including within large 
infrastructure projects. This led to the creation of a 
new PPP law to facilitate and legalise the procurement 
system and to privilege these new partnerships within 
an evolving economic strategy. Within a few short years, 
power plant projects, major national highways covering 
the entirety of Syrian territory, an urban metro network in 
Damascus, and new airports were all projects that were 
to be realised through PPPs. The passing of PPP laws 
coincided with laws passed throughout Syria’s various 
ministries eliminating public sector monopolies on 
major projects, including electricity and transportation, 
thus displacing the central role of the public sector in 
major national works. Within this framework, the role of 
the public sector was not merely as a partner to private 
capital but also as a facilitator of land transfer, tax 
exemptions, and so on. 
Thus, there were many changes happening with the 
business networks and within the business community 
as a whole prior to the outbreak of conflict. There 
are three broad changes that have accelerated the 
transformation of the Syrian business community in the 
context of the conflict and the emergence of a conflict 
elite after 2011: economic contraction, international 
sanctions, and capital flight. 
It is in this broader context that Syria’s war economies 
emerged, providing the conditions for the emergence 
of what I refer to as the “conflict elite”, specifically 
distinguishable from other profiteers and war 
beneficiaries. Generally speaking, the conflict elite 
are individuals or small networks that operated 
predominantly in regime areas and who have been 
central to the regime’s shifting modes of economic 
governance during the conflict, especially concerning 
attempts to evade sanctions. These elites are not 
necessarily linked to the regime through familial or 
social linkages but instead through a system of mutual 
benefit and interdependency in which the regime has 
been forced to cultivate and rely on them to stimulate 
economic activity. Their importance emerged in so 
far as they linked their activity – such as procurement 
from the outside or transportation – to the needs of 
the battlefield. In some cases, they have taken up 
leadership positions in various chambers (such as the 
Damascus Chambers of Commerce and the Damascus 
Chamber of Industry) and other bodies. To stress, as the 
conflict dragged on, the dual impact of sanctions and 
capital flight meant that many people on the boards of 
these Chambers either resigned or fled the country. In 
2012, every single member of Cham Holding’s board 
was under US sanctions, so they resigned and were 
replaced by an entirely new crop of people outside of 
the sanctions regime. This the crux of what I am talking 
about – the process of how the sanctions created this 
need to have a new kind of elite. Years later, internal 
rules within the Chambers led to the dismissal of 
chamber members who had fled the country, and their 
replacement by some of these new elite. 
There are three broad changes that 
have accelerated the transformation of 
the Syrian business community in the 
context of the conflict and the emergence 
of a conflict elite after 2011: economic 
contraction, international sanctions, 
and capital flight.  
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A crowd of people around the Yelbagha complex; a construction project that started in early 1973 and is still 
“undergoing construction’ after more than 45 years. Yelbagha has come to symbolise the kind of nepotism and 
institutional corruption within the Syrian Government. The project has so far cost the Government 700 million 
Syrian pounds, estimated to be seven times more than its initial estimated cost. Photo credit: Tarek Kebaisy.
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Unlike the upper strata of the pre-conflict business 
class, who are primarily involved in the formal economy 
such as in production, services, and trade, the conflict 
elites function as intermediaries and facilitators to 
ensure that goods can be brought to regime areas. 
This role is a function both of the conflict elites’ lack 
of investment capital and of the specific opportunities 
afforded them during the conflict. And while they may 
have lacked the wealth and investment capacity of other 
elites, their presence in the country and their access to 
the political and security apparatus have made them 
important actors.
They generally come from varied social and economic 
backgrounds and have not displayed any tendencies 
toward autonomous collective representation. In other 
words, they remain fragmented and lack the cohesion 
or interest to act in a unified autonomous way. Rather, 
they have sought to integrate within existing modes of 
representation or within new bodies such as the Syrian 
Metals and Steel Council, which was formed during the 
conflict. They tend to have emerged from two different 
situations: first, those who owned small or medium-
sized enterprises prior to the conflict and chose not to 
divest of their assets and leave the country, and second, 
private- or public-sector managers who had established 
enterprises during the conflict. One of the key factors 
driving their formation is their relationship with regime 
officials, especially from within the security apparatus. 
Their central role began as one of intermediation. 
I stress intermediation here in contrast to the extractive 
role that we may think of other actors as playing. I would 
consider, for example, activities such as kidnapping, 
looting, taxation, and so on, as extractive, short-term, 
and unsustainable activity that is underpinned by 
violence. In contrast, intermediaries were implicated 
in violent economies but not directly guiding them. As 
such, they were well positioned to facilitate transactions, 
evade sanctions, serve as fronts for the existing elites, 
and so on. 
How, then, is the emergence of the conflict elite relevant 
to the discussion of the National Partnership and to the 
question of PPPs more broadly?
The National Partnership was promulgated in 2016 and 
with it came the end of the Social Market Economy. 
Far from being a policy blueprint for reconstruction, 
the National Partnership represents an approach 
to reconstruction that builds on some of the main 
marketising and privatising elements of pre-conflict 
economic policy through the centralisation of PPPs as 
the core approach to reconstruction. Again, to stress, 
this is an idea and an approach, not a coherent set of 
policies. But as an idea it indicates the central role that 
private capital will play in Syria’s reconstruction. This is 
not simply because of the government’s obvious fiscal 
problems, but part of a trend in Syria state formation 
since the 2000s to shift and open up spaces for capital 
accumulation within the business community. The final 
frontier, so to speak, was always large-scale public works, 
and the conflict’s transformations have shattered that 
border and opened all areas of the economy to private 
investment. Through this framework, the state commits 
itself to a transfer of wealth and assets under the guise 
of reconstruction. I should say parenthetically that there 
is no specific model for PPP. It could be public or private 
capital, but in the Syrian case I believe that the state’s role 
as a partner is to facilitate these kinds of transfers. 
For the conflict elite, the PPPs give them a way to 
connect with existing capital networks and to shift 
from the role of intermediation to deeper roles in the 
economy. In many ways, the conflict elite became so 
because of their ability to intermediate in conditions of 
violence. Now, the National Partnership is a way to bring 
them into existing capital networks. 
To conclude, the National Partnership reflects both 
contemporary processes of state formation and the 
social transformations wrought by the conflict. Syria’s 
authoritarian peace leaves long-term questions of 
reconstruction largely peripheral and the possibility of 
a comprehensive, socially-grounded reconstruction 
programme virtually nil. In other words, the kind of 
comprehensive liberal peace that is imagined in many 
of the discussions about Syria will not happen. Indeed, 
when I was in contact with a Syrian economist recently 
and asked him about all of the policy documents being 
produced in the West about Syrian reconstruction his 
response was blunt but very informative: “nobody in 
Damascus is talking about this”. Instead, what has 
emerged is a strategic approach to reconstruction that 
is premised on attracting and circulating capital into the 
economy through PPPs, a strategy that both extends 
processes of state formation prior to the conflict and 
incorporates new sources of power in the form of the 
conflict elite. 
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The reordering of power relations and the Syrian political economy
By Dr Bassam Haddad
Dr Bassam Haddad is Director of the Middle East and Islamic Studies Program and Associate Professor 
at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. He is the author of Business 
Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford University Press, 2011) and 
currently working on two book projects: his second book on Understanding The Syrian Tragedy: Regime, 
Opposition, Uprisings (Stanford University Press, 2019-2020) and a co-edited volume on A Critical 
Political Economy of the Middle East (Stanford University Press, 2019). Bassam serves as Founding 
Editor of the Arab Studies Journal and the Knowledge Production Project, as well as the Middle 
East Pedagogy Initiative (MESPI). He is Co-Producer/Director of the award-winning documentary 
film, About Baghdad, and director of the series Arabs and Terrorism. Bassam is Co-Founder/Editor 
of Jadaliyya Ezine and Executive Director of the Arab Studies Institute. He serves on the Board of 
the Arab Council for the Social Sciences and is Executive Producer of Status Audio Magazine. Bassam is 
Co-Founder and Editor of the Salon Syria Project. 
During the past seven odd years, the war economy has 
produced its own drivers of wealth, numerous mogul 
warlords, and a new layer of business entrepreneurs that 
will become part of, or perhaps the crown of, any new 
upper class. The Arab Gulf countries, former economic 
backers of the regime, have been fully replaced by Iran  
and Russia. 
Power relations at the local and regional levels have also 
been re-ordered, with a growing perception that the biggest 
regional winner is Iran. New forces have emerged: the 
paramilitary units that fought alongside the regime, local 
leaders in non-regime controlled territories, and others.
While support for armed rebels was significant, supporters 
saw the conflict in strategic terms. In contrast, most 
regime allies saw the conflict in existential terms, and acted 
accordingly. Meanwhile ordinary Syrians became invisible 
to both sides and their original uprising against dictatorship 
was rendered unimportant. For ordinary Syrians, Syria has 
been almost wholly destroyed, and after decades of regime 
repression, they found themselves and their aspirations 
marginal to leading rebel groups with whom they have little 
in common. They were extras in a theatre of continuous 
power plays. We must centre the interests of the majority 
of Syrians as we address reconstruction, governance, 
transition, and development. This does throw a wrench into 
the plans of most states and international organizations 
who have descended and will descend on Syria for profit 
and power.
With the passage of time, the fault lines are becoming 
clearer. If you prioritised the fall of the Syrian regime, your 
interests were not served, and you just move on, or better 
yet, move away from Syria. But if you prioritised the triumph 
of a revolution that is antithetical to dictatorship, you 
suffered a visceral loss, a loss you cannot move away from. 
The distinction is crucial and consequential in the case of 
Syria, considering the active supporters of all sides in the 
developing proxy war. Still, this distinction has been missed 
by many well-meaning observers and supporters of the 
Syrian revolution. 
As individuals, groups, or states, we must understand 
the motives of those who want to help with 
reconstruction. Regime supporters are by definition 
interested in its survival, which clearly does not involve 
socioeconomically equitable or politically democratic 
development. Supporters of armed rebels generally 
wanted to replace the regime with a more compliant 
one, whether for domestic or regional purposes, and 
were unconcerned with whether it would serve or 
represent its citizens. International financial institutions 
just want a piece of the pie. The people who matter or 
are concerned with the interests of an equitable and free 
Syria have long been marginalized, and find themselves 
yet again on the margins of any reconstruction process.
As to the domestic setting, the last thing on the minds 
of Syria’s strongmen is any form of compromise, let 
alone a political transition in which they share any 
modicum of real power. Where others see the calamity 
of almost half a million Syrians dead, and more than 
half of the population of Syria displaced, the regime 
views what transpired as an affirmation of its power and 
reach, as well as being a lesson to others should they 
seek to re-ignite an uprising.
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The regime sees itself as an embattled victor, making 
diplomatic efforts towards political transition a foregone 
failure. It sees itself in control of what it calls Sourya 
al-Mufida, or useful Syria, despite some areas being 
controlled by others. Rebuilding, reconstruction, or what 
are called “good governance” programs are therefore an 
extreme uphill battle, in the best case.
I am aware that this leaves very few and less lucrative 
options. But this is precisely what we have to work 
with if we are genuinely concerned about a Syria for all 
Syrians. It is the starting point from which trade-offs 
can be made, rather than an ideal to be discarded or 
held onto at all cost. Good intentions about equity and 
justice alone will not rebuild Syria, but there are practical 
and acceptable degrees of departure from principled 
positions that operate as necessary trade-offs. If either 
the regime or the values of the dominant global political 
economic order have their way, unfettered, we are likely 
to see the reproduction of power relations, cronyism, 
and subsequent inequitable and/or exploitative 
outcomes that will reproduce the conditions that 
spurred the Syrian uprising in the first place.
Thus, we are not allowed to say in the future that “there 
was no other way but to submit to the regime or to 
international forces with capital.” There are paths that can 
be supported and have been. The task is to maximize 
this support while pointing out and affirming based on 
historical record the potential calamity of power-driven 
alternatives that will replace people-driven ones.
Business classes
The question of business classes that can be relied on 
to invest in a post-war Syria has been looming for some 
time. Divisions along several axes – within regime circles 
and between it and other political actors – has shattered 
the unity of the national economy by 2012, and the rentier 
business class, which existed and flourished in the pre-
2011 era, along with it. Larger independent businesses 
have suffocated under the weight of insecurity and/or war, 
leading to massive capital flight. Small and medium-sized 
businesses stumble along out of necessity and have seen 
their fortunes shrink or disappear. Driven by new sources 
of wealth, the war economy has created its own business 
moguls in a variety of sectors.
The state and the business community
The regime wanted to build a business community, or parts 
of it, in its own image, from the early 1970s. The process 
of capital accumulation and its correlate neoliberal-like 
policies in the 1990s and 2000s was about to create an 
Egypt-like situation, where the market begins to compete 
with the state as a means for upward social mobility and 
the attainment of power. However, this competition did not 
seem threatening given that much of the new big capital 
was controlled by or directly owned by economic actors 
beholden to the regime. In the 2000s, it had an inflated 
sense of security domestically, causing it to overplay 
its hand in unravelling the state-centred economy. This 
process started after 1986 and culminated in the vague 
notion of the social market economy in 2005, which 
reflected the increased power of capital in Syria.
The Syrian uprising interrupted this process of capital 
accumulation and the regime is now far more insecure 
in its dealings with the business community. New state-
business relations will be even more tightly controlled by 
the state. As it did with its allies, it will reward the business 
community via rebuilding and reconstruction schemes. 
This will be at the expense of most Syrians as well as of 
the worn-down state, which will be denied any benefits 
from the privileges that will be accrued by the new moguls. 
The regime will also see this process of rewarding the new 
economic actors as part of its political reconsolidation 
and will not compromise it for more rational or equitable 
notions of rebuilding and governance. It will instead do its 
best to limit, by law or by force, the empowerment of most 
societal segments in the process. 
The regime as formidable obstacle
Today, and at least for the past two years, the regime 
has deployed a legal and financial framework to achieve 
political, economic and demographic goals. Examples 
include zoning and rezoning, reclamation, possession, and 
transfer of ownership of private property. Without local 
and grassroots organisation, such schemes will continue 
to proceed at a significant rate, creating new realities 
that support regime reconsolidation in the short run but 
exacerbate the same sources of discontent and dissent 
that initially propelled protests. 
False assumptions, untenable policies, and 
detached reconstruction programs
The idea that effective reconstruction programs and sound 
governance go hand in hand is logical and desirable. But 
many pay scant regard to the dominant realities on the 
ground or to the dominant new rules of the game.
The challenge has been one of agency and authority, with 
both being a function of existing power relations that are 
hopelessly skewed in favor of the regime. What authority is 
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expected to approve the myriad reconstruction programs 
that are incessantly being hatched outside Syria? What 
agency will oversee and implement such programs?
If the Syrian regime is the answer, then much of the 
rebuilding and good governance discourse any institution, 
scholar, activist or politician can muster will not see the light 
of day, unless it creates a largely dissent-less Syria, with 
laws and regulations that control the public. 
The regime’s view of the role of reconstruction is key to 
understanding the realm of the possible, if not the probable. 
And to understand its view, we must look more closely into 
how the regime views the process, nature, and outcome 
of the last seven or eight years. In short, the regime is now 
in what I call fortification mode, which will certainly block 
efforts that benefit any other party and may even cause 
friction with its own allies when hostilities are over.
Domestic challenges
• Political transition is unlikely without pressure from 
the regime’s most significant allies. 
• Identity politics is not going away. This would be a 
challenge for virtually any program, even if the regime 
were to disappear tomorrow. 
• Disciplining a new crop of warlords, moguls, and 
those who benefit from and facilitate their operations 
is a challenge even for the regime, and certainly for 
the local populations that suffer under them.
• Most of the Syrian populace consists of children and 
youth, who will grow up in relative destitution, absent 
sufficient education and health provision institutions 
and with few economic opportunities. With most 
children having skipped many years of schooling and 
a vast number of breadwinners within families having 
perished, this problem is significantly exacerbated and 
is not much discussed in highbrow discourses about 
the future of Syria.
Regional/international challenges
• The regime will provide geostrategic, economic, and 
security payback for allies before considering any 
rational analysis or reconstruction program.
• When the semblance of stability seems more 
permanent, internally displaced refugees and those in 
other countries will be under more pressure to return. 
With measures such as law 10 in place, where will 
they return to? And there are many other obstacles.
• After the question of Idlib and other areas are 
resolved, and all hostilities have been settled, there will 
potentially be divergences between the Syrian regime 
and some of its allies, particularly Russia. This will 
hinge on various factors dealing with the policies and 
tensions surrounding involved states, not least Turkey, 
the USA and Iran. 
Smiling faces from Douma in the countryside of 
Damascus. April 2018. Photo credit: Maher al Mounes.
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Beyond law 10: economic and social challenges of housing and land management 
in post-conflict Syria
Summary by the report editors of the presentation given by Dr Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj at the conference
Dr Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj is a consultant on urban planning, development and local governance. He 
is Co-coordinator of the Syria Project at the Common Space Initiative in Beirut, where he is engaged 
in facilitating various dialogue and research projects for peace building and recovery planning in Syria. 
Formerly, he was the CEO of the Syria Trust for Development, and served on the boards of several 
NGOs and public commissions. His professional and research work relates institutional, financial and 
political frameworks to the production of the built environment. In 2007, Omar was the recipient of 
the Aga Khan Award for Architecture as team leader of the Shibam Urban Development Project (GIZ). 
He subsequently served on the master jury and the steering committee of the Award.
1 Around 0.5m died directly as a result of violence and around 1m are estimated to have died because of indirect consequences of the conflict such 
as the lack of medicine and healthcare, famine and malnutrition.
Housing, land and property issues in Syria far predate the 
conflict. The legal framework for defining property rights 
is a complex system that has seen six generations of 
overlapping and contradictory land transformation and 
housing policies, reflecting different periods of political 
transformation as well. The backlog of these contradictory 
statutes hampered the emergence of an effective land 
management system.
Freehold (private property) constitutes only a small portion 
of the property system in Syria, with the rest under a range 
of different tenure systems, complicating the matter further 
(see chart on page 13). From the Ottoman Land Code in 
1858 to 2011, approximately 100 laws were issued. From 
2011 to 2019, there have been 55, showing the depth of 
transformation in the past eight years.
The state’s management of these sectors could not cope 
with the pace of growth in the 20th century. The regulatory 
role of the state was overstretched and contradictions 
in the system allowed for corruption and clientelism. 
Consequently, the backlog of unresolved grievances with 
regards to property rights was a root cause for the conflict 
in some areas.
There is also a legacy of social problems, notably in relation 
to inheritance law, which is particularly relevant since it is 
estimated that around 1.5m people have died as a result of 
the conflict1. Different confessional groups have different 
considerations with regards to inheritance and mixed 
marriages create an added layer of confusion.
Inheritance laws in Syria for Muslims follows a complex 
tradition based on Hanafi jurisprudence which favours 
men but if followed correctly should result in a 39-40 
per cent ownership of real estate by women. However, 
research has shown that the actual percentage of 
ownership of real estate by women is closer to 10 per cent 
due to prejudice by the courts and pressures of social 
norms to further disenfranchise women. The number of 
women who will be disenfranchised from their rightful 
properties will far outweigh the number of people that are 
to be impacted by law 10.
The Syrian government has applied the law of eminent 
domain, which gives access to a wide range of legal 
instruments to expropriate land and property without 
a transparent process to explain discrepancies in 
compensation schemes. Compensation frameworks 
were not upgraded to reflect inflation and compensations 
did not recognise intangible rights and usufruct rights. 
The state, however, did not want to disrupt the land 
taxation and salary scales in order not to destabilise the 
social contract. 
This has allowed the state to maintain two parallel 
economies, formal and informal. The formal economy was 
kept in principle low, but access to the formal economy 
is what creates privilege for the few who are part of the 
regime’s patronage structures.
Early in the conflict, the government adopted an unofficial 
policy for widespread demolition in neighbourhoods where 
local communities had taken up resistance against the 
government. There have been various cases in which, 
under the pretence of removing debris, entire blocks were 
taken out to create wider streets for security purposes. 
Then the government started issuing new laws regarding 
the removal of debris and the removal of demolished 
buildings, legitimising the process. 
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Tenure Continuum in Syria
The progression of six generations of land transformation and housing policies. Private properties (freehold) are only the  
blue part on the left. Credit: Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj.
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Aleppo case study
The first map below shows the average prices of built-
up areas in Aleppo before the conflict. The poverty 
zones are visible around the city. Eighty per cent of 
property damages took place in impoverished and 
informal areas and the rest in formal areas as shown 
in the second map. The bulk of this damage was 
located in areas outside government control.
Average price of built-up area in Aleppo. Credit: Abdulaziz Hallaj
Heat map showing the destruction of residential buildings in Aleppo. Areas coloured in red are 
100 per cent destroyed, in orange are 40 per cent and yellow are 20 per cent. Source: pbs.twimg.
com/media/C0ODchhWIAAcHhl.jpg












































Ratio of damaged housing stock (2017) to total Government spending pre-conflict (2010). Figure shows the extent to  
which public funds are insufficient to cover reconstruction costs. Credit: Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj.
The cost of reconstruction of the housing stock far 
outweighs the availability of public funds. Based on 
public spending prior to the conflict, it would take 20 
years to rebuild the housing sector in Aleppo alone. The 
burden of reconstruction has been shifted to the private 
sector because it is very evident that the public sector 
will not have sufficient resources. The private sector 
became the mystical solution to this problem. 
Land pooling: shifting the burden of 
reconstruction to the private sector
In 2012, law 66 was issued allowing the destruction of 
informal houses in two neighbourhoods in Damascus 
and reconstruction through the concept of land pooling. 
The idea of land pooling is that “under-utilised” urban 
areas are reorganised to capture better value. The 
private sector is then allowed to take advantage of that 
increase in value in return for reconstructing the area. 
The profits would then help rehouse displaced persons 
and generate income for the municipality. 
Those theories are all well, provided that communities 
are involved and participating in the decision making. 
But the main problem we have here in Syria is that 
most communities are not there. This runs contrary 
to the international norms and the Pinheiro principles, 
that if you are going to use such schemes they must 
be transparent and inclusive. You have to bring the 
community to participate in the process and cannot do 
it while the community is away. 
Land pooling is a common international practice, 
used for example in Japan, Spain and Germany, for 
dealing with damaged areas after war, provided it is 
participatory and fair. Changing property structures in 
the absence of stakeholders (which would be the case 
for many areas in Syria), is against international norms 
(the Pinheiro principles).
Two areas in and around Damascus served as pilot 
tests for law 66. These projects were supposed to be 
finished within three years but faced major financial and 
legal hurdles. So now all we have of these two projects 
are huge holes dug in the ground for infrastructure. It is 
important to note that the municipality of Damascus, 
which was pushing for these two projects, is the most 
powerful municipality in Syria. Other municipalities do not 
have the same access to top-level decisions to remove 
the red tape on the implementing laws around territories. 
The lesson learned was that the new series of laws has 
not resolved protracted problems arising from previous 
housing, land and property (HLP) laws and the government 
has so far not been able to remove the red tape around 
these issues. At present, a review of the entire system has 
not been considered, although vitally needed. 
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Children toys among the rubble of a destroyed building at al Yarmouk camp. Photo credit:Maher al Mounes.
Law 10: A minor amendment to an existing law 
in a complex legal environment
Law 10 was issued in April 2018. It caught the attention 
of the international community, especially as it was 
issued after the regime recaptured Ghouta, which 
awakened international advocacy efforts to policies that 
had been ignored in the past as international actors were 
disengaged from policy debates in Syria. In reality law 
10 comprises not much more than an addendum and 
minor improvement and elucidation of an already existing 
law (66/2012), effectively allowing the selection of new 
“organisation zones” across Syria. While realistically 
it only constitutes a small part of the problem, it is an 
important advocacy tool. Legal glitches and overlapping 
jurisdictions delayed the implementation of law 66 and 
a much more centralised political push was needed to 
overcome bureaucratic hurdles.
Law 10 is not a property law, it is an urban planning law 
that affects property management without changing the 
nature of property as such; HLP rights are still protected 
by other laws. The more substantial threat of this law is 
that it will devalue property, not that it will deny people 
their property rights, even though the latter is also a risk.
A complex legal eco-system
Fifty new laws have been enacted since 2011, changing 
the political economy of land and housing management 
in Syria. They include:
• laws focusing on managing cadastral systems  
and protecting tenure
• laws affecting urban planning (law 10 falls into  
this category)
• laws regulating the power of eminent domain
• economic laws that regulate state subsidies  
and taxation
• laws defining the mandates of local and national 
government bodies and their abilities to engage in real 
estate transactions.
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Economic considerations of land pooling 
projects: Preliminary findings
A pre-feasibility study of law 10 that looked at the 
economic considerations of land pooling projects showed 
that conditions differ greatly from one zone to another, 
and no solution can be implemented across Syria. 
Spontaneous settlement areas require major upgrading 
even without the impact of war. On average, each hectare 
in the areas that are not badly damaged requires an 
investment of about $0.6m to bring in basic services 
and amenities that enable refugees to return. Damaged 
neighbourhoods can range from $2-9m per hectare, 
depending on the level of damage. Capital investments 
for implementing law 10 are about three times more 
expensive than the average costs of simple rehabilitation 
and will produce only half the number of housing units (to 
have reasonable market values or to break even). In most 
areas, law 10 will not break even unless housing units 
are sold at double or triple their pre-war prices. Capturing 
values to cover alternative housing arrangements for 
displaced persons in other locations, while still generating 
substantive profits for investors, will only start becoming 
feasible if housing units sell at about four times their pre-
war prices. Market absorption is therefore very doubtful 
in the event of a massive implementation of law 10. Most 
original inhabitants will not be able to afford to buy in the 
new developments and will be displaced into other zones. 
Economies of scale affect prices considerably. Larger 
zones require up to half the price per hectare of smaller 
zones. Implementing law 10 on small zones is likely 
to be unfeasible; the primary candidates for a feasible 
implementation of law 10 are large zones of more than 
400 hectares. Smaller zones may be better managed using 
law 23/2015 as the overhead costs will be big. 
We are then talking about investment packages of 
$1-2 billion. So the question is: where will this capital 
come from? Regime cronies and investors who want to 
pragmatically take advantage of the situation will probably 
only be interested to a certain extent. But how many of 
those exist? The few initial investors who are ready to enter 
this market are likely to be money launderers and regime 
cronies. And we have the basic business rule that dirty 
money brushes clean money away. If we add to this the 
application of the sanctions and the restriction on money 
transfer into and out of the country, the market will be 
dominated by a few cronies. 
Neither the availability of finance nor the absorption 
capacity of the high-end housing market are likely 
to make law 10 replicable in more than a few zones. 
The application of sanctions and the inability to move 
money in and out of the country will greatly affect the 
availability of “clean” investments. Implementing law 10 
will have a direct impact on inflation and the future price 
of housing units. The market will readjust, rendering 
future calculations on current market prices even less 
attractive. So not much revenue will be made from 
further law 10 developments. Law 10 has an intrinsic 
limitation on its capacity to generate funds as it moves 
forward. And, as we have seen in different parts of Syria, 
these huge infrastructure projects just end up as holes 
in the ground for years to come (see image below). 
Construction work at the site of Marota City project. One of the projects of Cham Holding. The land of the project was previously 
occupied by informal houses. Source: Marota City website.
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Conclusions
• The main issue is the full picture of the conditions of 
return for Syria’s displaced, beyond law 10. Law 10 
will not generate enough revenue in the long term but 
might generate just enough short-term revenue to 
convince regime cronies to go along with the regime. 
If that is the case, it will take about seven to eight 
years to implode. At the same time, there will be a 
demographic youth bulge that will need to be dealt 
with. The next one is happening right when Law 10 
type projects would have reached their maximum use. 
So, what is going to happen and how are we going to 
catch that convergence in seven to eight years?
• The regime is not likely to use Law 10 everywhere 
because the planning tools stipulated in the law are 
replicable only in very specific places. Today, Law 10 
dominates the political sphere and directs attention 
away from more risky policy issues (gentrification 
and the economic risks of displacement, women’s 
HLP rights, weak governance and adjudication 
systems, etc). 
Recommendations
• The overall framework of land and housing 
management policies needs to be reviewed,  
and not just law 10, especially with an eye on the 
harm expected once the reconstruction process  
is unleashed.
• Half of HLP problems can be instantly solved upon 
the establishment of small financial incentives. Many 
houses are not badly damaged and would require 
minimal financial packages once political guarantees 
are provided for the secure return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons. A mixture of grants and 
soft loans could enable half of refugees to go back. 
• HLP problems cannot be tackled wholesale. The 
bulk of over 2 million remaining cases of HLP 
disputes will need to be divided into manageable 
packages. Conditions of return for refugees vary 
and do not solely depend on security, which is 
indeed a main concern, but also includes economic 
conditions, governance, jobs, infrastructure 
etc. Issues affecting refugees’ return are not 
homogeneous. There are varieties of cases that will 
emerge. We need to consider how we can divide 
them into manageable packages. If we are going 
to look into six million refugees returning under one 
package, no one is going to return. 
• Judicial solutions will not be expedient. 
Administrative solutions must be considered as 
judicial oversight will be essential. The design of 
such administrative packages must be advanced 
now before the facts on the ground are made 
permanent. Informal and traditional dispute 
mechanisms may be useful in some cases but not 
in areas with major historic grievances. 
• Informal and traditional mechanisms are important 
but will not work everywhere. In some areas 
traditional mechanisms themselves are part of  
the problem and we need to be very careful not  
to generalise. 
• Social solidarity will be key to mitigating disputes. 
Traditional networks, complemented by blockchain 
technologies, can be effective in certain urban 
contexts. These solidarity networks can be worked 
on with refugees from outside the country.
• Many cases will fall through the cracks and a 
baseline social safety net is needed to cover the 
poorest of the poor who will not be able to resort to 
other forms of compensation.
• Special attention is needed to assist women to 
obtain their HLP rights and consider the challenges 
of women’s inheritance law. We need to design 
positive adjustment into the system. 
• A political language will need to be defined to be 
inserted in the text of the final settlement (be it an 
agreement or a new constitution). This will not be 
done without all parties to the conflict agreeing to 
the process.
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Chapter 2: Private sector and its role in  
economic development
The role of private business in peace and development
By Dr Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic
Dr Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic is Co-Director of the UN Business and Human Security Initiative at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research focuses on the political 
economy of conflict and development. She is particularly interested in understanding how the 
war economy affects post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding, the impact of international 
assistance and the relationship between business, human security and peace. She has 
published research on these topics with a geographic focus on the Western Balkans, Turkey, 
Colombia, Afghanistan and Syria. Her latest publications include “Wholly local? Ownership as 
Philosophy and Practice in Peacebuilding Interventions” and “European Union in the Western 
Balkans: Hybrid Development, Hybrid Security and Hybrid Justice”. Vesna is also the co-editor of 
the forthcoming book Whole-of-Society Peacebuilding.
The private sector has a pivotal role as a driver of 
economic development and an actor which can 
contribute to peacebuilding in a variety of ways, 
through its core function of stimulating growth, creating 
entrepreneurial opportunities, providing jobs, and 
generating wealth. But the way in which these functions 
are implemented and the environment in which business 
operates will determine whether its impacts will be 
positive in terms of economic opportunity, equality, 
social justice, the natural environment and governance. 
These elements together underpin sustained peace by 
addressing the root causes of the conflict. If economic 
growth generated by the private sector does not translate 
into more equitable wealth distribution, job creation and 
accountability, it will do little to remove the sources of 
tension and fragility within a society. 
Private business is never politically neutral: decisions  
to produce, invest or create jobs have political and  
policy implications which can shape the peacebuilding 
process. Therefore, the first step is to look at the kinds  
of business that exist in the local context and the  
nature of their involvement in the conflict before being 
able to consider how they can support economic 
development and peacebuilding, and how to avoid 
potential negative impacts. 
Experience shows that war-time adjustment in the private 
sector has a long-term impact and economic reversals 
can be deep and protracted. This has consequences for 
the relationship between private business and economic 
development in such contexts. These consequences are 
at the core of the post-war reconstruction programmes 
supported by international actors.
Private business is affected by conflict in manifold ways; 
from the loss of assets, capital, skills and infrastructure to 
the disruption of governance which hinders its potential 
to contribute to economic growth and development. But 
of note in contemporary conflicts is the emergence of 
new actors and rules which affect businesses by creating 
enduring regulatory instability and unpredictability. Local 
SMEs, which arguably have the greatest stake in the 
return to normality and peace, are especially at risk in 
an environment lacking rules and regulations and where 
corruption is pervasive and rights compromised.
A particular challenge stems from the emergence of new 
governance actors (especially non-state armed actors) 
and new business elites reliant on violence, and their 
amalgamation through war economy dealings. These new 
governance/business arrangements often include state 
actors who are also engaged in the “business of war” – 
that is, in illegal and criminal activities that proliferate in 
the war economy. But there are also cases in which the 
private sector acts as “governor” by becoming a provider of 
public goods – although this too may entail having to cut 
deals with armed groups and criminal groups, creating a 
different platform from which to engage in peacebuilding. 
These different facets of the business presence on the 
ground impact its potential for a positive contribution to 
economic development, both during conflict and in its 
aftermath. It is important to bear in mind when speaking 
about the business sector that it is not a monolithic 
actor with a unified agenda. The interests, incentives 
and capabilities of businesses, and hence their courses 
of action, differ according to factors such as size, legal 
status, ownership profile, and the broader security and 
geopolitical framework. This will also be determined by 
the extent and the manner in which a business is linked 
to the political and military elite. Paying bribes may be 
the only option for SMEs to survive during and after the 
war. Meanwhile for TNCs it may be the way to secure 
privileged access to business opportunities, as has been 
the case of cement manufacturer Lafarge, charged with 
financing terrorism in Syria. 
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The end of conflict does not mean that the business 
operating environment has changed. Business often 
faces many of the same difficulties: weak and corrupt 
institutions, political instability, the presence of organised 
crime, inadequate access to finance, infrastructure 
problems, skills shortages etc. Such security, governance 
and market conditions influence the propensity to 
invest in the long term and hence affect the job creation 
associated with a peace dividend. What all this means is 
that there are sometimes exaggerated expectations of 
private business capacity, will and feasibility of action in 
conflict and post-conflict contexts, including business’s 
contribution to truth and reconciliation as a way of 
dealing with historical legacies.
International assistance/approaches
The international approach in support of private sector 
development in conflict-affected areas has for a long time 
relied on universal blueprints with policy reform packages. 
Such approaches have often encountered political 
obstruction and failed to achieve expected outcomes. 
This has to do with the reluctance among donors to 
commit to approaches better suited to address the unique 
specificities of societies affected by armed violence 
and fragility, which would render a different view of the 
role of the private sector. More recently, there have been 
indications that such practice is beginning to change. 
A key aspect in this respect is the importance 
of conducting broad and sustained stakeholder 
consultations to better understand the challenges of 
private sector development in such contexts, and how 
private sector growth can most effectively contribute to 
economic development in a manner that addresses the 
impact of conflict at the local level. Another key change is 
the recognition that the private sector is not and cannot 
be approached as a stand-alone actor. Rather, the notion 
of “business-based peacebuilding” relies on the model of 
multi-stakeholder partnerships as a framework for more 
proactive engagement of the private sector in dealing 
with issues of development, peace and security.
While the actual processes of the private sector’s 
involvement in peace-related activities differ across 
countries and different conflict zones, a common trait has 
been a tendency to work as much as possible with other 
societal actors. These include international and local non-
governmental organisations, local governments, religious 
and academic institutions, international donors and 
multilateral institutions. Experience shows that business 
is most effective in addressing conflict-related issues 
when working collaboratively with other actors.
LSE UN Business and Human Security Initiative 
The UN Business and Human Security Initiative 
programme at LSE has proposed a multi-stakeholder 
partnership model called “Human Security Business 
Partnerships” (HSBP). This is a novel framework for 
private sector engagement with communities and other 
stakeholders from the private, public and civil society 
sectors to direct their combined effort to improve human 
security and contribute to peace and conflict resolution. 
It proposes a new form of partnership which can 
help re-set relationships between businesses and 
communities as well as other relevant actors in their 
areas of operation. The partnership model is based on 
the identification of common ground, the creation of 
shared value, shared risk management, and leveraging 
the relative capacities of those actors to create synergy 
from collective action. It uses human security as a lens 
to understand the local context in which companies 
operate and as a methodology for developing inclusive 
and integrated responses to local challenges of peace, 
security and development. At its core, the framework 
is about a new form of inclusive and sustained 
dialogue between private business, civil society, local 
communities and other stakeholders, that can enable 
protection and empowerment of the local population 
through identifying and enlarging areas of overlapping 
concerns and interests between investors, companies 
and communities. Through a novel form of collaboration 
including business, the aim is for companies to be able 
to contribute comprehensively to addressing the multiple 
and interlinked needs of the population; and that local 
communities, rather than being mere “beneficiaries” of 
such partnerships, will also be able to participate on 
an equal footing in these partnership schemes. The 
HSBP framework will be implemented in UN-supported 
programmes of jobs and livelihoods creation in Liberia 
and Colombia.
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The role of the Syrian business community in the diaspora;  
the example of SIBA
By Samer Chamsi-Pasha 
Samer Chamsi-Pasha joined his family’s textile industry in 1981 upon earning his Mechanical 
and Aerospace Engineering BS degree from the University of Pittsburgh. While at Pitt in 1979, 
he was awarded the Outstanding Achievement Award given annually to the highest achieving 
student in the School of Engineering. He continued his education in 1983-1985, graduating from 
the London Business School MBA programme. Previously, Samer had served on the London 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Council (1991-1994) leading several trade missions, as 
well as being elected Vice President of the Syrian Arab Association in the UK (1994-1996), the 
main Syrian Expat Community representative body in the UK.
Currently Samer serves as Vice President of International Humanitarian Relief  
(ihrelief.org) at its HQ in Vienna.
2 Such as the Welfare Association in Homs which dates back to 1955 and is fully funded through private donations. 
The Syrian International Business Association (SIBA) 
was formed in 2017 through a World Bank initiative to 
represent the Syrian business community in the diaspora 
and to engage with Syrians and offer support. One aim is 
for the established Syrian business community abroad, 
which had previously left the country, to help newly 
arriving Syrians to integrate into their new communities. 
This came after meetings and consultations with the 
World Bank following its study about Syrian business 
networks around the world. SIBA discussed with them 
ways to organise the Syrian business community in the 
diaspora through a platform with which governments can 
interact and assist with common problems faced by the 
Syrian business community outside the country. 
SIBA is registered in Canada as a non-political, not-for-
profit international organisation, with chapters to be 
formed in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, Egypt, Armenia, 
the UK, the USA, the UAE and countries in South America. 
The diverse portfolio of countries serves SIBA’s stated 
aim of representing and empowering the Syrian business 
community outside Syria “through the generation of 
meaningful business and employment opportunities 
across sectors, development of relevant technical 
business skills, and integration of Syrian economic 
interests into the economies of host countries”.
Historical role of the business community  
in modern Syria
Syria’s mercantile class, prominent since Ottoman times, 
has traditionally been the main driver of the economy 
in Syria. Syrian governments have at several stages 
experimented with various social experiments which 
were not exactly beneficial to the economy. 
But the mercantile class has traditionally played a 
stabilising role through solidifying social cohesion 
and maintaining merchants’ historical interconnection 
with religious establishments. Religious charities have 
customarily been funded through private donations from 
the business community2, which in turn established 
a social support network that often supplanted the 
government’s own failures and fostered social cohesion 
and religious tolerance. 
An example is the Welfare and Social Services 
Association of Homs which was formed in 1955, and has 
since provided a backup social support network. It was 
supported by local businesses.
The mercantile class was mainly urban based. But 
through trade flows and movements, Syria’s business 
community can also be credited with cultivating better 
relationships between the countryside and urban centres. 
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Bazaar in Damascus’ old city. Photo credit: Tarek Kebaisy.
3 reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-economy/fridges-and-flour-syrian-refugees-boost-turkish-economy-idUSKCN0VS1XR
The Syrian business community abroad and 
its role in economic development
Despite the detrimental economic policies undertaken 
by successive governments since the 1960s, Syria’s 
traditional mercantile class has solidified the economy, 
mainly through SMEs, and continues to play this role 
until today. The Syrian business community in diaspora 
has also contributed substantially to the development 
and resilience of Syria’s economy through investments, 
remittances and the transfer of knowledge and skills. 
During the conflict, foreign remittances from Syrian 
diaspora groups have kept the Syrian pound from further 
deterioration. The diasporic business community has 
also contributed substantially to the growth of host 
economies, particularly in countries such as Turkey,  
Egypt and Jordan. 
Some Syrian businesspeople inside Syria have also 
businesses outside the country. We are therefore 
not talking about a disconnect between internal and 
external business communities but a wide and varied 
business community.
The Syrian business community has also contributed 
positively to the economies of its host countries. In 2015, 
Syrian businesses in Turkey added about 0.5 per cent to 
Turkey’s GDP3, and there are similar success stories in 
Jordan and Egypt. 
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Post conflict facts
Out of an estimated total population of 23 million in 2010, 
seven million Syrians are now internally displaced and 
another six million have taken refuge in foreign countries. 
By 2018, there were 22 million diasporic Syrians. 
The conflict has emptied the country of both its 
intelligentsia and its skilled and semi-skilled labour 
workforce. The business community is qualified and has 
exceptional potential to play a role in the redevelopment 
of Syria’s economy through direct inward financial 
investments, facilitating and expanding the export of 
Syrian products, transferring business know-how and 
best practice, bridging sectors, business connections and 
communities and maintaining a two-way transfer of skills 
and experiences. 
To fulfil this role, the Syrian business community 
inside the country requires a new deal. In the 1980s an 
informal agreement between the late Hafez Assad and 
the business community gave business access to the 
economy without governmental control in return for 
political stability. That worked until the current conflict 
breached that agreement. Currently, there is no deal, 
and it is not clear what political settlement the current 
government is prepared to offer the business community 
for its return.
The Syrian business community outside Syria wants the 
following concerns to be addressed in any upcoming 
negotiations: personal safety and security, the rule of law, 
investment securities, and the upholding of housing, land 
and property rights. On an international level, it requires 
the economic sanctions to be lifted, an end to capital 
flow restrictions, more serious economic support from 
the international community, such as credit guarantees 
and financial support instruments, and better access to 
regional and international markets. 
The informal estimate is that the Syrian business 
community in the diaspora are worth about $200 billion. 
However, businesspeople face severe restrictions in their 
ability to move funds. Any Syrian trying to open a bank 
account will face many hurdles.
With a new deal, the sanctions need to be lifted to help 
Syria redevelop. 
In conclusion, the Syrian business community can be 
instrumental in the social and economic recovery of 
Syria. The current conflict has breached the traditional 
pact between the government and the business 
community. This must be redressed but not happen 
without reaching a new arrangement between the two 
sides. Without this, and without the active engagement of 
Syria’s business community, the Syrian economy will not 
fully recover in any meaningful way, and reconstruction 
efforts will be limited in scope and impact. 
The informal estimate is that the Syrian 
business community in the diaspora 
are worth about $200 billion. However, 
businesspeople face severe restrictions in 
their ability to move funds. Any Syrian 
trying to open a bank account will face 
many hurdles.  
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Syrian Enterprise and Business Centre
The Syrian Enterprise and Business Centre (SEBC), established in 1996, was the first European-
funded project in Syria as a result of the Barcelona declaration. It aims to support the private 
sector in Syria and facilitate the free-trade agreement between Syria and the EU. In 2011, 
following the uprisings, the EU was among the first to suspend all projects in Syria, including the 
projects implemented by SEBC. We spent two years looking at how to re-structure the SEBC’s 
role: the strategy has focused on preserving the Syrian economy, providing livelihood support to 
those who lost their means of sustenance, and work on post-conflict economic readiness.
The experience of SEBC shows that the private sector can play a vital role in Syria’s recovery and 
in building social cohesion, and that it therefore needs to be enabled and empowered. Therefore, 
early-recovery economic programmes, particularly textile and furniture enterprises, are acutely in 
need of funds and support. 
The account of a Syria-based businessman
The number of people with visible signs of malnutrition is 
more than five million. In terms of urban area destruction, 
25 per cent of urban areas have been destroyed while 
30-35 per cent exhibit partial destruction. Inflation went 
up ten-fold while salaries only doubled or tripled, which 
means a five-fold reduction in purchasing power in real 
terms for the average Syrian. Even middle and senior 
managers within private sector entities often find it 
difficult to make ends meet; the working class, on the 
other hand, find it impossible. 
All these factors started to hit the private sector. Many 
businesses had to lay off employees. Today, with the 
authorities trying to transition into a post-conflict phase, 
at least in some areas, businesses increasingly feel that 
the financial strain of the past seven years of war is being 
transferred onto private individuals and business by the 
government. One example is all the “martyr charities” that 
business people are “encouraged” to pay into; officially 
optional but unofficially not so optional. Problems with 
tax and other legal issues tend to start popping up if 
companies do not enthusiastically pay those charities. 
Another example of governmental extractions is through 
the custom tariffs that have increased exponentially 
over the past year or two. Normally the mandate of 
customs agencies is to police the country’s borders and 
make sure that contraband does not enter the country. 
These days, however, more customs agencies than 
usual are found deep inside the country and inside the 
cities. They stop whoever they think is worth stopping. 
Businesses have to deal with buses and vans being 
stopped on a near-daily basis.
The most recent trend is for the government to force 
people or businesses that have planning permission, 
or that have previously obtained licenses to build and 
operate but have not been able to in the past years 
because of the war, to immediately commence work 
regardless of whether this is possible. They threaten to 
strip away people’s licenses or expropriate their assets. 
The period of time given before this threat is acted upon 
is usually one month and this seems to apply to large-
scale and small-scale initiatives. This of course exposes 
the extent to which the government lacks funds at its 
disposal, funds that are necessary to rebuild or at least be 
seen to rebuild. This is a problem, especially in a banking 
environment where the non-performing loan situation 
across the banking sector is between 50-70 per cent. 
There is virtually no attention given to how one must 
build, the need to integrate accessibility concerns into 
any design, the importance of ensuring any measure of 
fair access to economic opportunities or educational 
opportunities, or wider stakeholder consultation or citizen 
participation of any sort. 
It is fair to assume that rebuilding and regeneration in 
the rest of the country will be carried out with the same 
disregard that we see in Damascus today. 
How can elements of deep-state war economies in Syria 
be decoupled or separated from wider local community 
structures in regime-controlled areas? 
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The account of Syrian SMEs’ entrepreneurs 
SMEs were ready and willing to accept the changes that 
hit Syria after 2011. Business elites close to the Syrian 
government established a business network among 
themselves, Club 100. They were taking over all aspects 
of the market. Everyone expected them to work on 
larger projects (PPP, banking, etc), which they did at the 
beginning. But from 2007-8 they decided to downscale 
their investments and compete with smaller enterprises 
(from small factories, agriculture, agri-foods, dairy 
products, shopping malls that affected small shops) 
and micro-businesses (taxi services both within the city 
and airport transfers, office-cleaning companies, and 
so on). We felt that we were living under a glass ceiling 
which was gradually being lowered, limiting our ability to 
grow and expand our business.
The relationship between the Syrian and Turkish 
governments also affected SMEs. Turkish export 
policy aimed at flooding the Syrian market with Turkish 
products. It facilitated exports and eventually affected 
the profitability of local SMEs.
The relationship between the Syrian and Iranian 
governments was one-way, enabling us to import 
Iranian products but not export to their markets.
The private sector has really been damaged in Syria. 
According to UN figures, more than 95,000 industrial 
units have been destroyed in the past seven years. 
Souks and bazaars have been destroyed. Border 
closures have also impacted businesses. The number 
of small businesses relying on cross-border transits 
(from Aleppo to the Naseeb Syrian-Jordanian border) is 
unimaginable. Many cafeterias and shops that relied on 
trade movements along those routes closed after border 
closures and the severe restriction on the flow of goods.
Syria is suffering from a lack of skilled and semi-skilled 
labour. Large-scale migration movements after 2011, 
particularly the displacement of entrepreneurs, businesses 
and SMEs because of the lack of security, loss of assets, 
or military conscription, affected the economy,
We currently have a severe shortage of all energy 
resources – and businesses rely on power and fuel.
Unilateral economic sanctions have overpowered non-
sanctioning states such as Iran, China, India and Russia 
and made Syria’s private sector more susceptible to 
exploitation, since it can only purchase from these states.
Syria’s private sector is inevitably empowering the 
war economy and the war lords. In the absence of 
banks, businesses must rely on illegal money-transfer 
and banking channels controlled by war lords. We are 
being blackmailed by them. For instance if I needed 
raw materials from China I would have to acquire them 
through war lord intermediaries. They transfer the 
money, so the import license (and consequently the 
products themselves) will be registered in their names. 
Some resell us these products. Others (who are highly 
connected) smuggle such products rather than import 
them, and transport them directly to our warehouses. 
This makes us increasingly prone to being blackmailed 
by the police, customs, etc since we have illegally 
imported these materials.
Money laundering has also overwhelmed many 
markets. Launderers can afford to sell at lower costs (at 
times equal to production costs) which makes it hard to 
compete; this legitimises their money.
While the banking sector was direly hit, some private banks, 
such as the Bank of Syria and Overseas, were able to 
continue operating. Photo credit: Tarek Kebaisy. 
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SME Case study: Resurrecting a small factory in Homs after the war
Abdelbaset Fahed lives in the al-Waer neighbourhood of the city of Homs, known as “the city of 
black stones” for its signature basalt. By 2011, he had established two small basalt and marble 
cutting factories in the industrial zone of Homs, employing 45 people.
4There are income tax exemptions for the years in which it’s proven, through a police report, that the facility was inoperative due to security 
conditions or to the complete closure of the area. Of course the exemption does not include water and electricity utility bills. 
In 2013, al-Waer was controlled by the armed opposition 
and was subsequently subject to a siege by the regime. 
Abdelbaset, who took a firm position against the regime’s 
violations, refused to leave al-Waer. He grew vegetables 
in his garden for subsistence and engaged in civil society 
activism and humanitarian work.
During the siege, the war escalated in Homs and 
the factories were severely bombed. What survived 
bombardment did not survive looting; everything was 
looted right down to the electric meter. Even the trees 
were logged. 
After a local agreement was reached in al-Waer in 2017, 
the siege was lifted and many people left for the north. 
Abdelbaset decided to stay in the city and took on the 
mission of resurrecting his factories. After more than a 
year and a half of work he managed to restart the smaller 
factory. However it now employs only two people, thereby 
supporting two families.
When asked about the obstacles he faced in this mission, 
his answer was:
1   Lack of financial resources. After eight years without 
work, half of that time under siege, he was unable to 
rebuild the factories. 
2   Lack of access to loans. Bureaucracy and strict, 
inflexible conditions make access to loans very difficult. 
3   Financial burdens. Abdelbaset must pay fees, taxes and 
social insurance costs to the government, in addition to 
utility bills4.
4   Limited market. There are no major construction 
projects that would require Abdelbaset’s services, as 
was the case before 2011, and individuals are carrying 
out only minor reconstruction to their own properties.  
5   Lack of skilled labour. Most of the skilled youth have left 
the country.
Abdelbaset has identified his main needs as being the 
return of skilled labourers, tax exemptions, and accessible 
loans with less harsh conditions. With this, he and other 
factory owners in the industrial zone will be able to 
reconstruct their businesses and offer employment.  
Abdelbaset Fahed outside one of his destroyed factories.
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A factory building of the stone-cutting factory before and after being destroyed in the war. The factory is covered with basalt,  
the signature stone of Homs in which the factory proudly specialises.
One of two workers the stone cutting factory now employs.
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Chapter 3: Reconstruction and donor conditionality
The political context for Syria’s reconstruction: Partial state failure,  
regime resilience and societal change
Summary by the report editors of the presentation given by Professor Raymond Hinnebusch at the conference
Professor Raymond Hinnebusch is a Professor of International Relations and Middle East 
Politics at the University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland. He is Founder and Director of the 
Centre for Syrian Studies. His works on Syria include Authoritarian Power and State Formation 
in Ba`thist Syria: Army, Party and Peasant, Westview Press, 1990; Peasant and Bureaucracy in 
Ba`thist Syria: The Political Economy of Rural Development, Westview Press, 1989; Syria and the 
Middle East Peace Process, with Alasdair Drysdale, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991; 
The Syrian-Iranian Alliance: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System, with A Ehteshami, 
Routledge, 1997; Syria: Revolution from above (Routledge: 2001); Turkey-Syria Relations: 
between Enmity and Amity, co-edited with Ozlem Tur, Ashgate Publishers, 2013;  
Syria: From Reform to Revolt: Politics and International Relations, co-edited with Tina Zintl, 
Syracuse University Press, 2014; and The Syrian Uprising: Volume 1: Origins and Early 
Trajectories, co-edited with Omar Imady, London and NY: Routledge Publishers, 2018.
To better understand the reconstruction process in 
Syria, we must position it within the larger context in 
which it has been wrought. Namely, that of the conflict 
and the way in which it restructured both the economy 
and the regime, in part by proving the latter’s resilience. 
This has had far reaching implications on reconstruction 
which can, through its depiction within the context 
of conflict, be seen as a continuation of the power 
struggle, albeit through other means. This has deterred 
reconstruction from functioning as a form of restorative 
justice and placed significant risks on the process. 
Syria’s war economy has seen massive capital flight, 
checkpoint taxation, increased dependency, a growing 
economy of looting, extortion and sieges. Under these 
conditions, new actors have thrived. 
A conflict society reflects the lack of social cohesion. War 
has been civilianised through the recruitment of a large 
number of the civilian population into militias. Sectarianism 
has been instrumentalised on both sides and deepened 
by the “security dilemma” of political polarisations along 
sectarian lines. The regime is remarkably resilient. 
It adapted to the conflict by adopting more violent, 
exclusionary, neo-patronage methods. As the tide turns, it 
undertakes to claw back lost territory from the opposition. 
Reconstruction, thus, has consolidated the regime’s 
position as a result of three main factors: The 
consolidation of crony capitalists through private-public 
partnerships for reconstruction; the redistribution of 
control over strategic areas through the introduction of 
new property laws; and the creation of secure zones, to 
be redeveloped as upscale housing for regime loyalists, 
which will also recentralise power. 
Decentralisation will also have implications on the 
reconstruction process. Since 2011, state control has 
largely contracted. The Syrian government lost control 
over some areas to the opposition, which subsequently 
created their own governance bodies and mechanisms. 
Not withstanding, centralised state control over the 
regime’s own territories has also been fragmented 
and replaced with local governance bodies due to the 
inability of the centralised state, economically, politically 
and administratively, to exercise power. This leads to a 
patchwork of power-sharing arrangements. 
Reconstruction will also be structured and curtailed by the 
geopolitical and geo-economic powers with influence in 
Syria. Geo-political powers, such as the Iranian-Russian 
coalition, have superior political advantage but fewer 
economic resources. And those that have geo-economic 
power lack the political leverage. The phenomenon of 
foreign interference will intensify following the defeat 
of IS, in a race to fill the power vacuum in the areas that 
were under IS control. Overlapping spheres of influence 
between foreign powers will create insecurity and partition, 
effectively deterring any form of integrated reconstruction 
effort and hardening ethno-sectarian fault-lines.
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Destruction in the old city of Aleppo. Photo credit: Tarek Kebaisy.
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The role of the US is more of that of a spoiler. The US 
can’t win the political-military battle but is in a position 
to use geo-economics to obstruct reconstruction. 
However, many new war profiteers have thrived as 
a direct and indirect result of US sanctions, through 
sanctions busting, smuggling and so on. 
Russia has strong strategic stakes and is well situated 
to both push reconstruction ahead and to act as a 
broker between regional actors and warring factions 
on the ground. Russia prioritises the reconstruction of 
state institutions, particularly the army and the security-
intelligence apparatus. It does this to impose a modicum 
of order and curb, disband or incorporate the lawlessness 
of militias which are detrimental to political security and 
economic recovery. Its aim is not the rule of law but rule 
by law, essential to the kind of stability and predictability 
needed for economic revival and investment. 
Russia’s resources are limited. The companies most 
prepared to invest in the conflict are energy companies 
and others run directly by the oligarchs. Russia’s 
diplomacy is geared towards attracting other investors 
via some minimally acceptable political settlement that 
would enable the return of some refugees, enough to 
entice funding support for this from European states 
and international organisations.
Iran’s stake is geo-political. Its presence in Syria is mainly 
to deter Israel and keep its Saudi rivals out. Constrained 
by US sanctions on its own economy, Iran is attempting 
to recoup some of its previous investments and loans 
to the Syrian regime by ensuring the regime’s survival 
through reconstruction concessions. The Revolutionary 
Guards, who own the largest construction firms in Iran, 
have signed major economic reconstruction contracts 
with the Syrian government. 
Turkey’s stake ends with the Kurdish people. To that 
end, it has occupied predominantly Kurdish areas in 
Northern Syria, trained and recruited local police forces, 
and set up local councils which operate vital services 
and schools (where the Turkish language is taught). 
Turkish companies supply electricity and services to large 
swathes of areas along and beyond its borders. More 
than 100,000 Syrians, residing in Syria, currently receive 
their salaries from the Turkish government. Going back 
to the previous point made concerning the fragmentation 
of reconstruction, Turkey here epitomises the kind of 
politicisation and conditions that affect reconstruction. 
To conclude, there are numerous impediments to 
the reconstruction of Syria’s economy. Those (both 
governments and organisations) willing to play a role in 
the reconstruction process should be wary not to further 
damage social cohesion, debilitate Syria’s sovereignty, 
reinforce war profiteers and the war economy, or 
consolidate the regime’s authoritarian structure. 
Governments with an interest in stabilising Syria and 
ensuring that the war is not reproduced should come 
together and wearily discuss how that can practically  
be achieved.
Overlapping spheres of influence 
between foreign powers will create 
insecurity and partition, effectively 
deterring any form of integrated 
reconstruction effort and hardening 
ethno-sectarian fault-lines.  
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Syria’s reconstruction – the good, the bad and the ugly5
By Dr Omar Imady
Dr Omar Imady is a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Centre for Syrian Studies at 
the University of St Andrews. He is the author of several books, articles, and UN reports on 
Syria. His current research interests include organisational aspects of civil society, and post-
conflict communities. Omar is also a published novelist and poet and his novel, The Gospel of 
Damascus, has been translated into several languages.
5 Reprinted from a blog drafted shortly after the conference. The blog piece can be found here: inspired-by-syria.com/single-post/2018/12/07/ 
Syrias-Reconstruction---the-Good-the-Bad-the-Ugly
Let’s begin with the “ugly”.
This would be the combination of laws, structures and 
projects recently decreed and initiated by the Syrian 
regime. They range from the vulgar “ugly”, like law 
number 10 which amounts to a large-scale confiscation 
of the homes of the displaced and refugees, to the surreal 
“ugly”, with luxury housing projects announced at the very 
site where families were pressured to evict their homes. 
A mother whose husband was killed during the war, revisits her home in al Yarmouk camp in mid-2018, only to find it in ruins. She 
shouts “My only remaining possession! I am exhausted from all this displacement, from being exploited and disempowered by 
others for being an unemployed widow”. Credit: Maher al Mounes.
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Indeed, the regime understands reconstruction as a 
process through which allies are rewarded, communities 
are redefined, and, just in case the “lessons” of the last 
seven years have not been fully absorbed, reconstruction, 
or the lack thereof, is used to invent memory. Areas that 
were known to be staunchly against the regime, like the 
Khalidiyyah neighbourhood in Homs or Salah al-Din in 
Aleppo, appear to be deliberately ignored, as though 
constituting reminders on a grand scale of the fate of 
those who stand up to the regime. All of this is “ugly” 
because of how indifferent it is to human suffering.
The “bad” reflects frameworks and agents that 
intrinsically lend themselves to abuse, either because 
of an obsession with material gain, or because of sheer 
weakness. Foremost among the bad are global actors 
and corporations that interact with reconstruction as 
though it was a guaranteed product that can be delivered, 
if only conditions can be met and the resources to pay 
the bill secured. Syria’s tragedy will only end through a 
political settlement that leads to a genuine transition 
towards an inclusive and democratic Syria. This noble 
objective, however, should not be pursued as a way 
through which the international donor community, the 
West in particular, can be convinced to adopt and fund 
Syria’s reconstruction. This massive project, estimated at 
anywhere between $200 and 400 billion, will be a project 
through which Syria is further broken rather than rebuilt. 
All one has to do is to study recent precedents, from 
Bosnia to Afghanistan and Iraq, to understand the way in 
which this inherently “bad” option works.
Corporations want to sell their products. They do so 
regardless of whether their products are irrelevant or 
even counterproductive to the area being reconstructed. 
Read if you wish the story of how Kellogg Brown and 
Root (KBR) ignored studies that pointed to the fact that 
soil was not compatible with plans to have a pipeline 
buried beneath the Tigris River. Three years later, after 
the bill had reached $100 million and nearly $1.5 billion 
in revenues was lost, the digging was finally halted. 
Or read Bassam Yousif’s account, Coalition Economic 
Policies in Iraq, in which he described how even as Iraq’s 
unemployment rate was near 40 per cent, foreign labour 
was imported in the tens of thousands. And just in case 
you think this is confined to Iraq, please also read about 
similar experiences in Afghanistan and Bosnia. Not only 
do these grand projects fail, there seems to be a direct 
correlation between how much money is used and how 
significant the failure is. Indeed, top-down approaches 
that are guided and controlled by global corporations are 
bad, even when they intend to do good.
The UN is another variation of the “bad”, but in my mind, 
it is far more moderate on the scale of bad, and at times 
even potentially useful. The UN does not confront the 
regime when it restricts its access to areas requiring 
humanitarian assistance. This is undoubtedly true, and 
it reminds me of how the UN acted during the siege 
of Madaya. Stationed in Damascus, and only forty 
kilometres away from where people were literally being 
starved to death, UN convoys stayed put. Also very 
difficult to process is when the UN agrees to oversee 
the displacement of entire communities from areas 
like Homs and Darya to Idlib. In this manner it becomes 
indirectly complicit in the purposeful demographic 
distortion of Syria. All of this seems to be reflective of 
weakness bordering on cowardice. And it is a trait that 
is contradicted at times even from within the UN when 
some UN reports describe in detail the regime’s massive 
and systematised violence. 
The UN, however, is also a structure within which a 
level of monitoring and accountability exists, as does 
evidence of successful initiatives with local communities. 
I once took part in such an initiative in Syria, and later 
documented the unfortunate way this experiment in 
political and economic empowerment ended. The 
weakness the UN exhibits when interacting with the 
Syrian regime can be partially explained by how restricted 
its current mandate is. As such, the UN is presently “bad” 
but has the potential to become a more positive force if 
it was empowered with the mandate to work directly and 
without regime restrictions with the millions of Syrians 
whose communities have been severely damaged over 
the last seven years. 
This brings us to the last and most important category, 
the “good”. The good, no doubt, are the Syrians 
themselves, who alone, so far, have truly engaged in 
the process of reconstruction, a genuine variant of 
reconstruction that aims at rising above the deep wounds 
and damage caused by seven years of violence. It is a 
creative, resilient and ongoing process of reconstruction. 
The good are the inhabitants of towns under siege who 
found ways to reconstruct their lives even as they were 
attacked and bombarded. They identified alternative 
means to generate power, built hospitals, and stocked an 
underground library with books rescued from bombed 
buildings. The good are Syria’s children who found 
ways to reconstruct their own schools by having the 
older children take the place of teachers, caregivers and 
counsellors for friends and younger siblings. The good 
are Syria’s women whose stories far exceed “survival”, 
and who indeed are actively engaged in reconstructing a 
life for themselves and their families.
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What is fascinating here is that as we continue to discuss 
reconstruction, how much it will cost, who will undertake 
it and under what conditions it will take place, those 
most in need of reconstruction efforts are neither waiting 
for help nor expecting it. This is far more about us than 
them. In identifying ways to provide assistance, whether 
through the UN with a very different mandate, or some 
other creative way that skids around the regime/global 
corporations trap, we are in fact demonstrating that even 
though we have totally failed in stopping the violence that 
was unleashed against the Syrian people, we have at least 
succeeded in assisting them in reconstructing their lives.
Boy selling roses in the streets of Damascus. He is one of Syria’s many impoverished children, who dropped out of school in order 
to work, and whose socio-economic conditions were impaired by economic stagnancy and war. Photo credit: Tarek Kebaisy. 
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6 See for example Syrian people suffer after Pyrrhic victory.
7 for a full review of EU conditionality towards Syria before and after 2011 see Chapter 4 in (Kaldor et al., 2018).
8 European Council: EU leaders discussed Syria and migration, 16/12/2016, available at: eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ 
headquarters-homepage/17450/european-council-eu-leaders-discussed-syria-and-migration_en
According to its own narrative, the Syrian regime “won 
the war”. Evidence from the ground, however, suggests 
that this Pyrrhic victory is putting the government in 
a very challenging position as the war is no longer an 
excuse to not deliver the basics6. The regime and Russia 
are becoming aware that the damage caused by the war 
far exceeds their ability to restore the country, and that 
international support, not just financial assistance, is vital. 
Western donors have framed their potential support for 
reconstruction in Syria within an evolving state-centric 
conditionality. I shall review the logic and impact of such 
conditionality, taking the EU as an example. 
Before 2011, the EU aimed to use negotiations for an 
association agreement and access to programmes 
and facilities as leverage to drive a process of 
democratisation, respect for human rights and good 
governance and accountability in the management 
of public funds. It was a positive incentivising 
conditionality which rewarded compliance in 
governance reform with increased financial assistance 
through the governance facility. But there was no facility 
that made financial assistance conditional on political 
reform and respect for human rights. Public criticism in 
the EU of human rights abuses in Syria was also very 
limited during the negotiating .. period, with few critical 
statements before 2011 being mainly motivated by 
individual cases.7
Two months after the beginning of the uprising, the 
logic of EU conditionality changed into negative 
sanctioning conditionality in response to the Syrian 
regime’s use of excessive violence against civilians. 
They suspended all cooperation programmes and 
participation in the EU’s regional programmes and 
subsequently imposed an expanding list of sanctions 
on individuals and institutions, promising the reversal of 
these steps should President Assad step down.
By the end of 2016, the negative sanctioning 
conditionality was combined with positive incentivising 
conditionality by promising support for reconstruction 
once “a credible political transition is firmly under 
way”8. In April 2017, this was clarified as being when 
“comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, 
negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the 
basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and 
the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way”.
The impact of conditionality 
It is difficult to assess the impact of pre-2011 
conditionality since the events after 2011 disrupted 
the entire process. But none of the post-2011 
conditionalities have achieved their intended outcomes. 
The president did not step down, the Syrian regime is 
yet to show serious engagement with the Geneva-led 
process and the sanctions did not result in the desired 
change of behaviour.  
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Reconstructing the bazaar in the old city of Homs as part of UNDP led project. Photo credit: Maher al Mounes.
9 The World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators, updated 10/19/2016. 
10 Ibid.
Complete disengagement and extensive sanctions were 
counterproductive. They led to a loss of leverage for the 
EU while the situation in Syria continued to escalate, 
rapidly developing into a regional and international 
crisis. Even so, the EU ended up as the biggest 
contributor to the massive conflict humanitarian bill. 
Most good governance indicators were already poor 
in Syria before 20119. Failures in the foundation of 
governance and development date back decades 
before the beginning of the conflict. However, after the 
conflict, performance has collapsed to one of the lowest 
rankings in the world in terms of political stability, the 
absence of violence, control of corruption, voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
and regulatory quality.10
Below are some examples of the impact of the 
negative sanctioning conditionality imposed by donor 
governments, where sanctions and disengagement 
were either the sole or contributing factors.
1   The regime was forced into full financial dependence, 
as well as its existing political and military 
dependence, on its patron states, particularly Iran 
and Russia. While western sanctions overall could 
have weakened the regime financially, the resulting 
financial and economic entanglement with these 
supporting states enslaved the regime even more to 
their interests. 
2   The EU and its member states lost political leverage 
and the ability to influence the behaviour of the regime.
3   Sanctions mainly affected ordinary people. They 
exacerbated the humanitarian situation, increased the 
level of fatigue and reduced people’s ability to resist 
increased oppression.
4   Sanctions made Syria’s private sector more prone to 
exploitation by states supportive of the regime, since 
they became the only source of imports.
5   Legitimate businesses were badly damaged while 
crony capitalists flourished and a new war elite class 
emerged. Smaller businesses were worst hit as they 
were less able to circumvent sanctions.
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6   The war economy was accelerated and became an 
active driver of the conflict.
7   The informal economy became the new formal way 
of conducting business because of the sanctioning 
of financial institutions, government ministries and 
related infrastructure (such as transport).
8   Complete disengagement, combined with sanctions, 
prevented access to supporting anything beyond 
humanitarian aid (such as the emerging civil society) in 
government-controlled areas.
Supporting reconstruction would now be difficult even 
with EU goodwill and regime compliance. The only actors 
able to receive large funds and deliver big projects would 
be those closely linked to the regime, as the middle class 
has been hollowed out and there are limited numbers of 
independent civil society organisations and businesses. 
Moreover, financial transactions outside banks has 
become the norm, with the remaining ones unable to 
process the required flow of funds. Pouring large funds 
into this environment would only further empower the 
authoritarian regime and the new war elites and feed into 
all the socioeconomic roots of the Syrian crisis. 
Why didn’t conditionality work?
A key reason is the behaviour of the Syrian regime and its 
refusal to comply with international law or human rights 
and to end the use of violence against civilians. Related 
is the EU’s lack of enforcement tools or instruments of 
influence beyond economic power. 
But such conditionality has not worked in other conflict 
settings. Conditionality does not work when the entity 
imposing it is supporting a party to the conflict against 
another. The EU asked the Syrian president to step aside 
while recognising and supporting the National Coalition 
for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SNC). 
This binary positioning kills any desire for compliance 
even for economic gain, especially amidst a complex 
geopolitical setting. 
The unconditional political support by the EU to the 
Syrian political opposition is, however, contrasted by the 
EU’s laudable support to Syrian civil society and emerging 
governance structures in opposition-controlled areas, 
combined with small-scale support to civic initiatives all 
over Syria. This supports democratisation, respect for 
human rights and aiding the bottom-up construction of 
legitimacy by not imposing one actor over another.  
Pouring large funds into this environment 
would only further empower the 
authoritarian regime and the new war 
elites and feed into all the socioeconomic 
roots of the Syrian crisis.  
Most punitive steps imposed on Syria by donor 
governments often appear to be symbolic rather 
than instrumental, mainly due to the lack of other 
policy options and the pressure on policymakers to 
demonstrate action. Expressive political conditionality 
is not known to be effective (Fisher, 2015). Nor does 
conditionality work when geopolitics are put ahead of 
peace (Boyce, 2004), and within the complex Syrian 
conflict, geopolitics often emerged as a major issue for 
donor governments.
Towards a new conditionality
Like the incremental and multi-level process of change 
in Syria, conditionality should also be multi-layered rather 
than limited only to the top level. Meso-level conditionality 
is required, inspired by current needs and opportunities 
and rewarding progress on human rights, governance 
and democracy indicators, with monitored support to 
independent SMEs and civil society. This would also build 
confidence for subsequent engagement with broader 
political steps should conditions for reconstruction be 
met. Below are the basic elements of this conditionality:
1   The logic: Positive incentivising conditionality that 
aims at concrete achievable steps with the potential 
of making tangible improvements to the lives of 
ordinary people. 
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2   It must be designed for current needs and 
opportunities. Early recovery programming is needed 
in areas where violence has subsided, to kickstart a 
sustainable recovery from the conflict and prevent a 
relapse into violence. Programming must contribute 
to poverty reduction and the recovery of the legitimate 
economy, while also integrating peacebuilding into 
development. This should be supported by efforts to 
combat corruption and the shadow economy under 
which the war economy thrives, and to improving 
governance indicators. Central is the need to kickstart 
the revival of legitimate local businesses and 
independent civil society. These are instrumental for 
countering the dynamics of the conflict, aiding the 
process of democratic transition and unlocking the 
potential of Syrian society to help itself. 
It is important that a new conditionality approach lives 
up to the aspirations of Syrians and works with the 
incredible potential for societal change. The Syrian 
population, while impoverished and deeply fatigued, has 
never been as aware of its rights, and of its expectations 
of a just future society, than at this moment. After years 
of conflict, the closed nature of Syrian communitarian 
society has been cracked open and infused with new 
influences and impulses. Above all, Syrian youth have 
been impatient to help transform Syrian society. This 
intrinsic potential for change in Syrian society can be 
used for better or for worse. 
3   The level: Meso-level conditionality is engaged with 
the steps and stages of a process of change it wishes 
to see and is focused on concrete elements of this 
process. Such conditionality would focus on bringing 
about tangible, measurable change to people’s lives and 
introducing incremental mid-level change to governance. 
For example, certain sectors could be supported in 
return for progressive changes in their governance. 
There could be support for developing local economies 
and infrastructure in return for the decentralisation that 
would give locals greater autonomy. 
4   Indicators and oversight mechanisms: Implementing 
the conditions of meso-level conditionality is not 
a guarantee of actual change. Continued support 
should be conditioned by improvements to human 
rights, governance and democracy indicators and 
programme implementation should be monitored 
with oversight mechanisms.  
11 SLDP 2018. International Law and Reconstruction in Syria: a Cautionary Note for Businesses.
12 For insight about the level of frustration in these areas see section 3.3 in “Progress in the wrong direction: The 2018 Local Council Elections in Syria”.
Such indicators are also important for top-
level conditionality. The indicators of reaching a 
“comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition 
firmly under way” are unclear. Would the transition 
involve a change of people or change the overall system 
of governance? Would it change the legal system, or its 
implementation? What is the benchmark for a genuine 
transition? We argue that the measures for a political 
solution must be based on the tangible changes it makes 
to people’s lives and that this needs to be anchored in 
human rights. If, for example, appointments of opposition 
figures in power, or nominal changes to legal procedures 
leave citizens just as likely to be subject to arbitrary 
arrest, nothing has changed. 
New indicators should be the benchmark of compliance 
with conditionality in Syria to measure how change is 
actually happening. They should be based on people’s 
experiences on the ground, not on international 
agreements or unimplemented procedures. Their 
cornerstones should be human rights, governance and 
democracy. Each implementer or business, as well 
as the state, should comply with human rights and 
international law11
5   The incentives for the regime: The support would 
cover areas of acute need that the regime cannot 
fulfil given its shrinking ability to govern the country 
and provide for frustrated citizens. Its loss of control 
over many areas has led to the rise of local power 
agents. Areas taken from the opposition, such as 
Ghouta and Deraa, particularly need support. As most 
members of civil society and local councils have fled 
these areas, much support from western donors is 
gone. New civil society, however, is emerging and 
some small business owners are trying to retrieve 
their business, though with very limited resources12. 
Carefully reviewing sanctions with a negative 
humanitarian impact would also provide incentive. It 
is not only the Syrian regime that could be engaged 
with incentives. Russia is also pushing for western 
donors to engage and its leverage over the regime 
could support the process.
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Donor conditionality, sanctions, and the question of justice
By Dr Omar Dahi 
The question of donor conditionality and how it could be used to influence behaviour and 
promote respect for human rights and political inclusion has increasingly gained importance 
in debates on Syria as the conflict shifts to another stage. In this transition, many have raised 
hopes that conditionality can succeed where other means have failed. 
In the context of conflict studies, conditionality is often 
referred to as peace conditionality. Professor James 
Boyce and others coined this term to refer to the use 
of formal performance criteria and informal policy 
dialogue to encourage the implementation of peace 
accords and the consolidation of peace. Scholars 
of peace and conflict studies have contrasted the 
potential positive impact of peace conditionality with 
the dubious legacy of economic conditionality imposed 
by multinational institutions and other donors since the 
1980s era of structural adjustment. Peace conditionality 
should encourage policies that promote peace, justice 
and reconciliation processes, even if these contradict 
traditional economic policy prescriptions. 
70-year-old Syrian Mohammad Mohiedine Anis holding a picture of his younger self in the middle of his destroyed house in Aleppo. 
In an interview with an AFP reporter he said “I have had a very happy past but things have changed. Now life is hard, but we mustn’t 
lose hope”. Photo credit: Maher al Mounes.
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The most obvious problem with this in the Syrian case is 
that the above notion of peace conditionality assumes 
it is used for peacebuilding, not peacemaking. Peace 
conditionality is supposed to follow from negotiated 
peace accords between relative equals, not a near total 
victory by one side. Peace accords are statements of 
declared intent by the different parties to reduce or end the 
conflict, advance processes of reconciliation, transform 
governance structures, and commence measures 
for justice and accountability, as well as economic 
reconstruction. Even at their best, peace accords are 
aspirational. They may or may not be translated into actual 
policy, and it is hoped that conditionality would provide 
sufficient incentives to do so. What happens however 
when even those lofty and aspirational statements do not 
exist? If the victor has not even declared the commitment 
to make peace or initiate processes of justice and 
reconciliation, what is there to incentivise? Quite simply, 
what was not achieved through the conflict will not be 
achieved through conditionality.
On the other hand, the changing regional political 
landscape and shifting alliances are further dragging 
the geopolitical scene in Syria away from where it 
was in the 2011 to 2016 period. Internally, the conflict 
has empowered the warlords and the well connected, 
amidst staggering levels of death, destruction and 
displacement. Regardless of who claims victory, Syrian 
society as a whole has lost. Can this reconfiguration 
provide an opening for an engagement of a different kind, 
peacebuilding without a formal peace?
Perhaps, but only if it is accompanied by broader political 
initiatives, during which there is a desire to rethink previous 
modes of engagement and binaries that prevailed during 
the war and consider the needs and voices of Syrian 
society – all Syrian society, whether inside or outside the 
country. Here broad-based economic sanctions must also 
be reconsidered. At this point they seem to only serve a 
punitive purpose, but against the wrong people. Broad-
based economic sanctions have significantly damaged the 
Syrian economy, negatively impacting ordinary people and 
exacerbating the war economy. As far back as June 2012 
the United States Department of Agriculture identified how 




The net result of international actions has been to 
trigger a major depreciation in the Syrian currency (50%), 
dramatically increase domestic inflation, significantly 
deplete government financial reserves, and seriously 
restrict trade. Though current sanctions do not officially 
target food or agricultural commodities, restrictions 
imposed on Syrian banks and trading firms have 
somewhat impeded the country’s ability to finance 
needed imports13.
Similar negative effects have been found by others 
including the United Nations Human Rights Council Special 
Rapporteur’s September 2018 Report14. Sanctions have not 
caused the humanitarian crisis in Syria, but they worsen 
rather than improve the situation of Syrians. Sanctions 
empower the well-connected while others suffer. 
Peace conditionality can continue by considering the 
needs of the millions of refugees languishing in Syria’s 
neighboring countries. It needs to continue to consider 
processes and initiatives, even at the local scale, that can 
enable and further justice, accountability, equality, voice 
and representation for all Syrians, regardless of political 
perspective or declared loyalty. What medium to long-term 
processes will allow Syrian society to revive itself, and 
empower itself to achieve agency over its own future? 
In March 2019 it was eight years since Syrians took to the 
street to ask for a just and equitable society. Though they 
are exhausted by war, the question of justice remains more 
relevant than ever. Eight years ago, demonstrating Syrians 
raised the slogan “the Syrian people know their path”. For 
the devastating price they have paid for this demand, they 
should have a chance to voice their agency over their own 
future and once again know their path.
Peace conditionally needs to continue to 
consider processes and initiatives, even at 
the local scale, that can enable and further 
justice, accountability, equality, voice and 
representation for all Syrians, regardless of 
political perspective or declared loyalty.  
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As the head of a network of actors engaged in 
peace negotiations and peacebuilding – the Geneva 
Peacebuilding Platform – my starting question 
concerns how the end of conflict and post-conflict 
reconstruction in Syria will impact peacebuilding 
practices elsewhere in the Middle East and the world. 
To answer this question, I refer to my own work on the 
role of the private sector in fragile environments as 
well as to other research on the future of peacebuilding 
practices, the political economy in Syria during conflict 
and the role of the private sector in peacebuilding. 
The current literature on peacebuilding contains several 
reports and observations suggesting that peacebuilding 
is both dysfunctional and futile. At least one consultancy 
predicts a decline in donor assistance to peacebuilding 
in Germany, Sweden, the UK, and EU. Given the current 
precedence of a political environment that prioritises 
stabilisation over transformative approaches, some 
support to peacebuilding may be shifted to resilience 
and civil society projects. Overall, there is less 
willingness to invest in peacebuilding organisations and 
projects. Several international organisations and donor 
bodies view peacebuilding as an outside-generated 
large-scale project that produces stability, prosperity 
and participation all at once. 
From the opening session at the Political economy and governance in Syria conference in December 2018.
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Research carried out by scholars at Kings College 
London illustrates a significant shift from traditional 
peacebuilding practices to political settlements and 
negotiations. This is especially relevant to Syria where 
the previously-mentioned shift in policy environment will 
reflect in an over-prioritisation of stability and prosperity. 
Coupled with the power dynamics within Syria’s political 
economy, this will overpower partisan interests while 
marginalising participatory politics, which may be 
sequenced as part of formal discussions at a later 
transformative stage. However, participatory politics is 
currently, and will be for the near future, overridden by 
discussions around stability and prosperity. 
So, what does the current climate look like for 
peacebuilders who have focused much of their work on 
enabling and strengthening participatory politics? The 
answer may be to continue peacebuilding practices and 
projects without explicitly calling them “peacebuilding”. 
Some of this work might make use of 1980s peacebuilding 
activities that focused on building peace in the context 
of authoritarianism, with an emphasis on governance 
transformation from dictatorships to more participatory 
political systems. From this perspective, peacebuilders 
might find utility in structuring their work around three 
essential vulnerabilities of authoritarian regimes: 
legitimacy, compliance to norms, and people. Authoritarian 
regimes are always afraid of these three issues.
Regarding legitimacy, we can use the experience of 
Rwanda. This illustrates how a government that lost 
substantial local and international legitimacy, following 
the 1994 genocide, put all its eggs into one basket, so 
to speak. The government prioritised restructuring the 
economy, along a Western liberal model, to attract more 
investment and create more jobs. Business reforms 
were carried out while political participation was halted 
with hopes that economic growth would neutralise 
military actors, which it did to a large extent. 
Adopting this trajectory to Syria may offer novel 
perspectives on Syria’s peacebuilding challenges. First, 
regime officials and warlords will be the first to realise 
that post-conflict preservation of power will become 
much more difficult than it was prior to the conflict. This 
is partly because they will suddenly realise the need 
to deliver vital services (such as education, jobs and 
transport) and the institutional inability to deliver. The 
population will generally judge the government based 
on its ability to deliver. If the government manages to 
deliver some level of essential services it might help 
build some range of “performance legitimacy”. Yet this 
appears to be far-fetched for the government. It requires 
a level of commitment, and more importantly resources, 
that are currently unavailable in Syria. 
Hence, and here comes the second challenge, those 
currently holding power in Syria have little to no incentive 
to develop and commit to a formal political resolution 
to the conflict. The likely scenario for Syria in the next 
seven years is therefore a status of “no war no peace”, 
effectively meaning that there will be no final and formal 
political solution but lots of “reconciliation” realities will be 
created, with their own specificities and particularities. 
The primary challenge for Syria’s ruling authorities, 
after the end of the war, is thus how to strike a balance 
that guarantees regime stability and control over key 
industries while at the same time creating opportunities 
to satisfy and co-opt people outside of the government’s 
rent system in such a way that neutralises them and 
prevents them from threatening the function and 
pervasiveness of government rule. Such a balance 
is particularly hard to strike in a closed-access and 
monopolised economy.
Those currently holding power in Syria 
have little to no incentive to develop and 
commit to a formal political resolution to 
the conflict. The likely scenario for Syria 
in the next seven years is therefore a 
status of ‘no war no peace’.  
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After 9/11, many western states passed enhanced 
counter-terrorist legislation leading to the rise of a little 
known but incredibly powerful organisation called the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It produced a series 
of recommendations on how to restrict counter-terror 
financing. One of the recommendations identified, 
despite the lack of any real empirical information, the 
private voluntary sector as especially vulnerable to 
manipulation by terrorist organisations; potentially 
established by prescribed individuals, acting as a 
front for terrorist linked organisations or subject to 
manipulation in fragile and conflict-affected states. This 
recommendation caused a ripple effect through national 
regulatory structures and led to a market restructuring in 
the financial sector. Many banks looked seriously at the 
risks that they were facing by working with organisations 
that could be manipulated by terrorist organisations. 
Facing increasing fines and the added pressure of 
working with NGOs, the risk was not worth the potential 
reward. Fearing regulatory costs and fines, they 
increasingly limited their business with humanitarian 
organisations. They did this in two ways. Many banks 
shed NGO customers, closing their accounts with little 
warning and no redress. Correspondent banks were 
even more rigorous, blocking the movement of money to 
conflict-affected areas. This is what is now referred to as 
the de-risking phenomenon. 
The humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis has  
been particularly affected by de-risking in many ways.  
In particular: 
1   NGOs’ ability to cooperate with businesses/donors in 
the USA and Western Europe has been hindered as the 
financial due diligence required was not seen as worth 
the potential reward. Many NGOs have had their bank 
accounts closed and have found it difficult to move 
money to offices working in conflict states. 
2   Since correspondent banks, which deal with such 
transfers, are more vulnerable to fines and costs, 
they have instituted even more rigorous measures. 
As a result, the transfer of money to conflict-affected 
regions has become more difficult. 
3   The humanitarian financial space has been closed 
down and banks/financial regulators are now having 
a profound and unprecedented effect, shaping the 
distribution of humanitarian aid.
Another issue that emerges is how such financial 
regulations have reframed citizens in the global south 
not as beneficiaries of assistance or victims of crisis 
but as contributors to global risk. Populations that have 
traditionally fallen outside of western state power have 
been rendered governable by state institutions in the 
global north.
But when policy makers are faced with this, the usual 
response is “but we have no empirical evidence that the 
Syrian crisis is affected by bank de-risking”. In response, 
we started a research project to address the question of 
whether bank de-risking has affected the NGO community 
responding to the Syrian crisis. We asked whether there 
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is evidence of a precautionary approach to risk arising 
from bank de-risking and permeating NGO humanitarian 
decision making for the Syrian humanitarian crisis. And if 
so, is this used to render beneficiaries and/or humanitarian 
institutions governable? And reflecting the possibility that a 
precautionary approach to risk undermines organisational 
responses, does the management of risk lead to improved 
or reduced humanitarian outcomes and is it possible to 
identify the ways in which calculations of risk determine 
humanitarian priorities and coverage? 
The main results were published in Gordon et al., 
201815. The research used mixed methodology, largely 
qualitative in nature, involving 11 roundtables and a 
survey with 297 responses. The results of this study 
showed that the de-risking phenomenon has led to the 
following main problems:
1   Providers of humanitarian aid were under pressure  
to conform to regulations before responding to crises 
in certain areas, out of fear of being de-risked or  
de-banked. 
2   Almost a third of all money destined for Syria was held 
in an almost permanent limbo because of blockages in 
the correspondent banking system. 
3   The risk of being de-risked creates a ripple effect; the 
result was the funnelling of humanitarian activity to 
areas that were most likely to get through donor and 
bank scrutiny. This meant that areas that were more 
marginalised and in need found themselves bereft 
of support. Humanitarians felt they had to identify 
the areas they responded to in line with regulatory 
requirements. They had to predict who they were 
dealing with in terms of logistics chains and partners. 
Any community that did not have this level of legibility 
and transparency was too dangerous to engage with, 
because once banks discovered the engagement, 
there was a danger that the humanitarian organisation 
would be de-risked or de-banked.
4   In the case of rapid changes such as forced 
displacement, NGOs found it really hard to respond 
because of the reporting problems and because of 
the need to rapidly move money to those areas. They 
would do this out of their own tight budget.
5   It caused a shift from cash response to outdated 
commodity-based responses, which could itself be 
manipulated or diverted by combatants.
15 Gordon, S., Robinson, A., Goulding, H. and Mahyub, R. 2018. The impact of Bank de-risking on the humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis.  
HPG Working papers.
6   Intensifying regulatory measures led to a counter-
productive regime.
7   The identified risk increases closer to beneficiaries 
along the humanitarian supply chain. This has 
left smaller NGOs that are closer to the affected 
areas more vulnerable to de-risking procedures and 
therefore more financially drained.
8   De-risking led to conservative and unresponsive 
programming choices. For a winterisation 
programme, organisations bid for the funding six 
months in advance and their funding is held up for 
six months. The programme is then out of date so 
they shift to something else; they are under pressure 
to spend the money rapidly and therefore choose 
something that is conservative and not necessarily 
the most effective use of money.
Another issue that emerged is how the risk was used 
by neighbouring states (such as Turkey) as a way of 
constructing objects capable of being governed and 
manipulated by the Turkish administration.
The results reaffirmed the fact that contrary to the idea of 
risk-based management and results-based management, 
which suggest that everything can be reduced to 
probabilities and managed accordingly (managerial 
logic), one of the predictions of risk sociology is that 
regulatory failure is highly likely to emerge out of efforts 
to regulate risk. The outcome is that policy makers are 
equally likely to create regulatory failure as they intensify 
the regulation of NGO financing as they were to address 
the problem they were dealing with. Risks in that process, 
the diversion of money in this case, were substantially 
higher than before the regulatory process began: an 
unanticipated repercussion.  
In conclusion, donors underestimated the scale of the 
problem of de-risking large Europe-based NGOs. And 
while the FATF believed the regulations would lead to 
more transparency, the results of the de-risking are 
that 100 per cent of NGOs operating in Syria use cash 
transfers or the informal hawala system. Syrian NGOs 
have also become overly dependent on western NGOs 
intensifying the sense that the global humanitarian 
system is an extension of western political institutions. 
44        Political Economy and Governance in Syria
Transforming armed groups and combatants in Syria: Implications for potential 
DDR, livelihood and the political economy
By Charles Lister
Charles Lister is a senior fellow and Director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremism Program 
at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC. His work focuses primarily on the conflict in Syria, 
including as a member of the MEI-convened Syria Study Group; and on issues of terrorism and 
insurgency across the Levant. Prior to this, Lister was a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution in 
Qatar. His critically acclaimed book, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of 
an Insurgency was published by in the UK by Hurst in late-2015.
2018 has witnessed the early phases of regime-style 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). 
This has been shaped by the following factors: (1) the 
integration of armed groups under the state umbrella, 
in order to reinforce regime rule but not to distribute 
power and address the causes of the war; (2) a 
coercive, stop-gap DDR process; (3) the lack of clear 
incentives or employment opportunities for fighters, 
and no guarantees of post-service protection; (4) no real 
incentive to relinquish one’s weapons after one’s service 
in the integrated armed groups.
Syria has evolved from being a shadow state to being 
a transactional one. If the state is based merely on 
transactions, how does that relate to an effective 
DDR process? The semblance of relative stability is 
through fear and coercion rather than legitimacy and 
credibility. Deep-seated corruption, the persistence of 
war, the shadow economy and the coping economy are 
troubling. All of this makes DDR look like a long-term 
pipe dream.
Russia’s role has been key. It has a strong relationship 
with the Syrian Arab Army and has started to 
re-centralise it. One should look at Russian-led 
reintegration efforts as being part of the state’s. 
Defeated opposition fighters have two options: 
integration into the army or evacuation up north to 
Idlib. Russia has been trying to create an “en masse 
auxiliary unit” in the Syrian Army. Its efforts are largely 
coercive and thus not sustainable in the long term. One 
theme is localisation. Given the recognition that this is 
a highly local conflict, ex-fighters are given the option to 
remain in their areas. There is also a largely Russian-led 
attempt to exploit the clear and broad anti-IS sentiment 
within the opposition, with fighters allowed to remain 
in their home town to fight IS. There are early signs 
of a “cleaning house” strategy. The more senior levels 
of opposition who have been reintegrated but remain 
potentially problematic have been slowly vanishing.
On the pro-regime side, the proliferation of Syrian 
loyalist militias really worked from a counter-insurgency 
perspective. The regime has the Syrian Arab Army (SSA) 
and Republican Guard. We have also seen the National 
Defence Front (NDF) and its forces leveraged up into 
auxiliary forces. Syrian Hezbollah has been utilised as 
an alternative umbrella for re-integration. The loyalist 
business community’s importance is in the filling gap 
in funding for the pro-regime militias and paying their 
salaries. This is establishing cronyism and corruption in 
the long term.
But how are all these different armed entities financed? 
There has been no significant or truly grounded work 
on this. Every single regime element is going to give a 
different answer as to its financing. The SSA is funded 
through the state. The Fifth Corps forces are reliant on 
Russian funding, and some on Iranian money. The NDF 
are much more locally rooted and financed and this 
is where some in the loyalist business community are 
involved in financing their own militias.
The war economy is indeed significant in funding the 
militias. Checkpoints, for example, are an incredible 
source of income for those who control them. This is 
the most critical concern. But while the war economy 
is a significant source of financing militias, the tap of 
big sources can easily be switched on and off by the 
political leadership. 
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Chapter 4: Governance, legitimacy and the  
role of civil society
Critical analysis of attempts to co-opt the tribes in Syria
By Dr Haian Dukhan 
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Since the start of the uprisings, the role of urban versus 
rural populations in igniting and leading the uprisings has 
persistently been the subject of debate and contention. 
Within the SWANA region, Syria has been the first to 
experience an overwhelmingly rural uprising. The affluent 
cities of Damascus and Aleppo did not play a major role 
in the uprising, at least not initially. Syria’s countryside 
has been widely populated by tribal communities; a large 
part of which were displaced from their villages in the city 
outskirts due to the 2007 drought. 
At the onset of protests, tribes played a substantial role 
in mobilising their communities to protest against the 
regime. As peaceful protests transformed into violent 
confrontations, many attempts were made by both the 
regime and opposition to win over and co-opt tribes to 
instrumentalise them politically and militarily. With the 
shift to a full-scale civil war, almost all armed actors 
from armed opposition groups (AOGs) to Islamist 
formations, Kurdish forces and the regime’s military and 
para-military factions tried to capitalise on their relations 
with tribes to serve their own interests. 
Short break for tribe members from Raqqa in the Raqqa countryside. Photo credit: Abood Hamam.
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I will attempt here to provide a critical analysis of local, 
regional and international efforts to co-opt tribal structures 
in Syria, while arguing that local attempts have generally 
been more successful in co-opting tribes than those by 
regional and international powers such as Turkey, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and the USA. This might have to do with the 
fact that local forces and structures are more aware of 
localised realities and histories, especially when it comes 
to the changes that tribal structures have gone through in 
the past couple of decades.  
This paper defines “co-optation” as the use of formal and 
informal mechanisms by particular authorities in their 
attempts to strategically draw groups to themselves. To 
help delineate such a theoretical postulation, I outline 
different forms of co-optation, which include the following. 
• Structural co-optation: which includes widening 
participation in such a way that allows strategic 
groups to partake in governmental decisions. An 
example of this is the establishment of the Raqqa 
Civilian Council (RCC) by the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) to diffuse the perception of the 
SDF as a Kurdish force that occupies an Arab-
majority governorate. Thus, the RCC’s co-chairs 
were Mahmoud Shawakh al-Bursan, an Arab 
tribal sheikh, and Leila al Mustafa, a Kurdish 
civil engineer. The RCC includes 20 local tribal 
representatives who were interested in attempting 
to foster social cohesion as well as thwart any 
attempted retaliatory acts against those thought to 
be associated with IS. 
• Traditional co-optation: under this framework, 
traditional leaders of strategic groups are 
approached as a means of co-opting the whole 
group(s). An example is IS’s attempts to force and/
or convince traditional leaders to publicly pledge 
allegiance to them.   
• Identity-based co-optation: includes the creation, 
revival and manipulation of religious, ethnic 
and tribal networks to mobilise the community, 
where the ruling authorities become the centre 
of patronage and loyalty. For instance, Hafez 
Al-Assad’s attempts to manipulate and revive the 
tribal identity as a means of stabilising the regime.
• Material co-optation: which all actors use. Here 
different authorities grant financial benefits to the 
groups that they want to co-opt.  
History of co-optation under Ba’ath party rule
Tribal power and authority were severely diminished by 
the pervasiveness of nationalist and socialist discourses 
following Syria’s independence. However, upon Hafez al-
Assad’s assumption of power in the 1970s, the regime 
established networks of patronage with influential tribal 
leaders. The latter’s pledge of loyalty to the regime was 
reciprocated with wider local authority.
A series of incentivising measures were thus put forth 
in order to absorb tribes into the state structure. State 
policies and subsidies favoured tribal leaders, thereby 
creating tribal social support for the regime that could 
be, and often was, used in conflicts with other societal 
segments, such as the Kurds and Islamists. These 
practices and policies were reflected in an increase of 
tribal representation in the al-Ba’ath party, the Syrian 
army and security apparatuses as well as in parliament.
This is an epitomic example of structural co-optation. 
However, two vital factors need to be considered here. 
First, the Syrian regime did not co-opt tribes in their 
existing hierarchies and structures but rather “created 
a new class structure by dismantling the power of the 
tribes from inside out… the regime side-lined traditional 
tribal sheikhs and replaced them with people associated 
with the intelligence services”, according to Sheikh 
Nawaf al-Bashir. Thus, the sheikhs’ roles, positions, 
and powers within their own tribes changed and were 
often diminished. Second, a weakening of kinship ties, 
resulting from factors such as education, physical 
mobility, settlement and urbanisation, amplified tribes’ 
susceptibility to being co-opted. 
An increase in education within tribal ranks led to 
the emergence of a young educated class who were 
generally more cynical of the authority of traditional 
sheikhs. This led to major intra-tribal divisions between 
modernists and traditionalists. At this stage, namely 
between the 1970s and 2000, tribal divisions had no 
Local attempts have generally been more 
successful in co-opting tribes than those 
by regional and international powers 
such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
and the USA.  
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significant impact on the regime. The regime continued 
to co-opt large numbers of tribal members, particularly 
from Deir Ez-Zour and Horan, into party leadership, 
government institutions and popular organisations such 
as the peasants’ union. 
When Bashar al-Assad assumed power, he continued the 
same co-optation policy in order to secure the regime’s 
survival. However, following the US invasion of Iraq, co-
optation came to hold another function. Bashar al-Assad 
delivered an unusual speech in Deir Ez-Zour praising tribal 
history and the tribes’ national struggle against the French 
occupation. The speech was part of a larger attempt to 
encourage large numbers of tribal youth to fight in Iraq, 
an initiative that would later garner political leverage for 
the regime on the international arena. As an incentive, 
the regime granted financial rewards for tribal leaders as 
well as governmental employment opportunities for their 
children and relatives. This is somewhat similar to the 
regime’s use of tribal connections, albeit on a regional level, 
to suppress the Kurdish revolt of al-Hassakeh in 2004. 
However, Bashar al-Assad’s policies of economic 
liberalisation disproportionately benefitted urban 
populations, particularly the major cities, while 
neglecting rural areas. Under him, the party apparatus 
and workers’ and peasants’ unions were regarded 
as obstacles to economic reform. Therefore, a large 
segment of their governmental funding was withdrawn. 
IS attempts to co-opt Syrian tribes
The contraction of state services to rural areas 
culminated in the increased impoverishment, 
marginalisation and frustration of rural populations, 
particularly tribal youths. However, tribal leaders still 
enjoyed special privileges and influence under al-
Assad’s rule and were also able to benefit from his 
neo-liberal policies. This effectively led to the creation 
of an affluent clientelist class within tribal structures 
themselves, locally coined as Awlad al-Sulta (or 
“progenies of the authority”), who were largely alienated 
from the rest of their tribes. Coupled with stark intra-
tribal class discrepancies, contraction in state services 
to rural areas created a level of grievance and lethargy 
in intra- and inter-tribal bonds that allowed for Islamist 
groups to capitalise on this social cleavage. During 
the early stages of the uprising, tribal youths took to 
the streets not only to protest against the regime’s 
unrestrained and atrocious exercise of authority but also 
that of traditional sheikhs.
While there is a wide retreat of IS from rural tribal areas, 
information indicates that IS might resurge in the eastern 
part of the country. Therefore, it is relevant to provide a 
critical analysis of IS’s co-optation strategy. 
Since 2013, IS has come to control large swathes of 
eastern Syria. Consecutive videos have subsequently 
emerged of tribal leaders publicising their allegiance 
and loyalty to IS. Similarly, IS also incentivised tribes by 
granting them wider margins of local authority. Traditional 
sheikhs were responsible for collecting taxes (Zakah in 
Islamic jurisprudence) within their localities, communal 
arbitration, civil documentation, and registering families in 
need of assistance. In return, those sheikhs were granted 
access to regional IS meetings, which brought together 
representatives from each region controlled by IS, and were 
also provided with bribes and endowments. 
The SDF succeeds in its co-optation attempts
Following the International Coalition’s alliance with 
Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG), the latter approached Arab 
tribes to construct the SDF, a united force against IS. Under 
this umbrella group, YPG and Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (YPJ) 
forces merged with tribe-based Arab militias. Later, the SDF 
itself widened the coalition to include the tribes of Ar-Raqqa 
in order to liberate the city and governorate. Once Ar-Raqqa 
was taken over by the SDF, a series of meetings with tribal 
sheikhs led to the creation of an administrative body called 
the Raqqa Civilian Council. It might be argued that SDF has 
been the most successful in co-opting tribes. Several young 
members of local tribes were provided with employment 
opportunities within the Raqqa Civilian Council.  
Turkey also organised meetings with tribal sheikhs in 
the South in attempts to mobilise them against Kurdish 
military forces. As a result, several tribal leaders publicly 
announced their support for Turkey’s “Olive Branch” military 
operation against Afrin. Although a full invasion of Raqqa 
seems unlikely, in part due to US opposition, Turkey still 
connects with Raqqa’s tribes to cause tension and unrest 
in the governorate.
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A council of condolences for Al Sanadid fighters who were killed during clashes with ISIS. Al Sanadid are a tribal militia, composed 
of members of the Shammar tribe, who operate under the umbrella of the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF). Source: Ronahi. 
The current status of tribes
Bashar al-Assad instigates tribes to pressure the SDF to 
hand over the Raqqa governorate to the regime. Co-
optation still happens along the lines delineated earlier 
while manipulation of internal power dynamics within 
tribal structures subsists, as a means of co-optation, just 
as it has been used since al-Ba’ath’s takeover of power. 
Tribes are an essential force for the regime to retain areas 
controlled in the east of Syria.
Since tribes are mobilised and co-opted by several of the 
warring factions in Syria, there is a risk of positing them 
against each other in a future battle. A US withdrawal of 
support from the SDF would increase that likelihood and 
open the possibility of inter-tribal confrontations over 
Syria’s eastern parts. 
To conclude, one of the most visible analytical outcomes 
of this research is that local forces and groups are 
noticeably more successful in co-opting Syria’s tribes than 
external powers. This is mainly due to the fact that external 
powers’ knowledge and understanding of tribal structures 
and their history hampers their ability to construct long-
lasting alliances.
An increase in education within  
tribal ranks led to the emergence of  
a young educated class who were 
generally more cynical of the authority  
of traditional sheikhs.  
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Reinventing state: health governance in opposition-held areas
By Dr Zedoun Al Zoubi
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The research presented here analyses health governance 
in Syria across three different phases of its institutional 
evolution, with more focus on the third phase. The 
research aims to map out the different structures that 
sought to provide health services after state institutions 
and services contracted, while delineating the social 
basis and political discrepancies behind each. 
The first phase came after the uprisings. A group of 
first respondent volunteers established the Damascus 
Doctors’ Coordination body. A couple of months following 
its formation, the body witnessed stark divisions which 
ostensibly appeared as disagreements over a statement 
but were, in fact, political in nature. The division was 
generally between conservatives, mostly Islamists, on the 
one hand and secular members on the other. 
One of the medical centres belonging to the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organisations (UOSSM). Source: Social Media.
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Those embroiled in the uprising seldom thought of 
proper medical governance, or any other form of service 
provision for that matter, since they were repeatedly 
promised that the regime would be toppled within a 
matter of months. It was only in 2012, when those 
promises lost currency and wide areas were taken 
over from the Government, that medical commissions 
and councils started emerging. However, those 
commissions were overwhelmingly established and 
used in rural areas. Political divisions within Damascus’s 
countryside, mainly between conservatives and 
seculars, prevented them from establishing a proper 
medical governance system. 
Divisions between urban and rural populations were 
clearly evident in the establishment and administration 
of medical committees. The Aleppo city Medical Council 
(AMC) was established following the city’s takeover by 
armed opposition groups (AOGs). It should be noted 
that the AMC did not admit people from rural areas 
into their hospitals in the very early stages of their 
establishment. As a result, communities in the rural 
areas of Aleppo established the Free Medical Union. 
The second phase saw stark changes in medical 
provision. During this phase, Gulf states channelled 
substantial funding, at times through their allies within 
the Syrian opposition, to medical committees and 
councils in Syria. This had a significant impact on the 
type of governance, activities, and internal dynamics 
among local medical committees. The Syrian Interim 
Government (SIG) used a Qatari grant it had received to 
establish a health directorate, albeit for political interests 
basing it on local communal needs. This untechnical, 
top-down approach to medical service provision proved 
futile, to say the least. The health directorate was 
established without any institutional body.
Months afterwards, 15 children in Idlib died during a 
vaccination campaign due to technical failures. It exposed 
and amplified the stark division between SIG and health 
authorities inside Syria, with the SIG largely placing the 
blame on local health authorities for this catastrophe. 
Members of the health directorate had to present 
themselves to Jabhat al-Nusra’s courts, the only available 
local courts at the time, and mediate the situation with the 
children’s families on their own. This was the end of this 
top-down approach. It led to a complete cut-off between 
the political and technical spheres. 
The third phase mainly started with the need, mostly felt 
by the health directorate and associated NGOs, to create 
an administrative authority larger than themselves. In 
2015, five of the largest NGOs signed a charter denoting 
their terms of understanding, emphasising the need 
to empower governance mechanisms and publicising 
their decision to create a quasigovernmental body to 
lead their to lead their response. The health governorate 
was thus established and remains the strongest body 
in opposition-held areas since 2016, largely because the 
body was technical, depoliticised and created from the 
bottom up. NGOs were able to secure substantial funds 
for the health directorate to be functional. However, 
funding is decentralised and therefore, for instance, 
funding is more readily available in Atmeh than it is in 
Southern Aleppo. 
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Timeline of the evolution of the Health Directorate. Credit: Dr Zedoun Al Zoubi.
A children’s activity organised by the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organisations (UOSSM) for children with special needs. 
Source: UOSSM’s Facebook page.
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Institutional legitimacy
In September 2016, the health directorate caught a truck 
piled with fake medicines imported from China and 
India and which belonged to Ahrar al-Sham. The health 
directorate destroyed the content, worth $3 million, and 
only survived because of its communal legitimacy and 
support. Another example is when fighters from Jabhat 
al-Nusra stormed hospitals demanding segregation 
between male and female doctors, nurses and patients. 
The health directorate and other NGOs immediately 
issued a statement denouncing such practices and 
halted their operations. Within a span of 24 hours, 
Jabhat al-Nusra issued a counter statement absolving 
themselves of responsibility and unrestrainedly halted 
such practices, fearing wide protests against them 
if all medical activities were halted. A third example 
was during the fight over Maaret al-Nu’man hospital. 
Similarly, a statement was issued and operations halted. 
Within hours, warring factions withdrew and put an end 
to military operations. 
A training provided for newly enrolled midwives and general practitioners who work in the reproductive health sector. Source: The 
Idleb Health Directorate’s Facebook page.
This is an epitomic example of how institutional 
legitimacy can be used as a vital and productive social 
force. Legitimacy has been essential for the health 
directorate to fulfil its role. While the Syrian Interim 
Government (SIG) remains more of a challenge than a 
source of support and the lines that divide institutional 
responsibility between the health directorate and local 
councils are far from clear, there is still much work to be 
done in health governance. Fears still mount over the 
future of the health directorate, particularly since many 
now view it as larger and stronger than it should be.
In conclusion, this research aimed at documenting the 
vital stages of health governance evolution in Syria. A 
central issue is that of institutional legitimacy. We have 
observed how institutional legitimacy that stems from 
communities themselves can be used as a powerful 
social force.
Political Economy and Governance in Syria        53
From the Q&A session
Q:   You said that the SIG, a body with legitimate power 
and the ability to make decisions, coordinate, 
give advice etc was needed. You also mentioned 
the failure of the SIG to do that. The SIG was not 
recognised as legitimate by the UN, or by many 
Syrians. SIG reps would say they were fought and 
advocated against. What are your thoughts on this?
A:   There is an issue with the term “government”  
itself, but not with the concept of “governance”. 
The way we needed health directorates, we 
wanted a governance system for the entire 
opposition held area. I am not criticising the 
SIG as a concept, I am criticising it as a tool to 
create legitimacy. The real question is why and 
how could Idlib’s health directorate create strong 
legitimacy when the SIG could not? The health 
directorate did not demand elections, it was not 
democratic; but it is recognised as a legitimate 
authority. The SIG could easily do something like 
that, but instead, it always opted to fight with 
NGOs and local councils. It never created its own 
legitimacy for example. 
Q:   Do you agree that the regime’s systematic attacks 
on health infrastructure contributed massively  
to destabilising the health sector in these areas, 
and that was an obstacle to more organising/
capacity building/regulation for the health sector 
in the areas?
A:   Yes of course. The ratio of doctors to people here 
in UK is 100:300, in Germany 100:247. In Idlib it’s 
1:6,000 people. And one of the reasons behind 
that is that targeting hospitals pushed doctors  
to leave. 
Q:   Can we speak about the governance of one 
institution at a time, or one sector at a time, or 
does governance need an ecosystem of sorts? 
The health directorate of Idlib survived because 
at some point, there was a fight between Ahrar Al 
Sham and al-Nusra front, and if either tried to take 
over that institution, the other would have fought 
it. So it survived at the critical junction of balance 
between two warlords who were afraid to overtake 
each other. And that created the space in which 
that institution grew, and then established its 
legitimacy and framework. This was not replicable 
in other sectors because in education there 
were already several more actors at play. Is this 
something that we can replicate/was it replicable? 
To what extent was health a model of sorts?
A:   DFID adopted a model of funding for education 
directorates through large private international 
implementers, and not through the Syrian CSOs 
working with the education directorates. This did 
not lead to developing legitimacy for the education 
directorate, because it was seen mainly as a 
recipient of the fund, similar to any other NGO, 
whereas the health directorate created a sort of 
funding mechanism that brought these institutions 
together. DFID stopped funding the education 
directorate because it was close to the salvation 
government or HTS. Had the funding mechanism 
created that critical mass of support around the 
education directorate by NGOs and local councils, 
then HTS would not have been able to penetrate 
it. So education was punished twice, first by not 
creating the right model for governance and 
second when funding was terminated. Funding 
schools is not enough, we need to fund the 
education system. 
       The health sector governance model is replicable. 
We do not have big education NGOs, but we have 
the right model for it.  
Q:   If the government takes control of Idlib, what do 
you think will be the future of these directorates?
A:   Health directorates were designed right from 
the beginning to be identical in their governance 
system to the government’s health directorates 
so that when/if a transfer were to happen, it 
would happen smoothly. If this were to happen in 
Idlib, there will be a system that could be easily 
integrated into the state (not the regime).
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Decentralisation and region-based representation in Syria;  
opportunities and obstacles 
By Dr Rim Turkmani 
The non-paper presented in early 2018 by the Syria 
Small Group (which includes Britain, France, Germany, 
Jordan, the USA and Saudi Arabia) proposed that the 
Syrian parliament should consist of two houses. The 
second house is envisaged to be constructed/constituted 
upon regional representation “in order to affect the 
decision making in the central government”. It also talks 
about the balance of regional interests and providing 
clear authorities/guidelines to regional governments 
according to the principles of decentralisation. In another 
recent paper by the same group entitled “Principles for 
a resolution of the Syria conflict,” it is proposed that 
“Authority should be explicitly devolved and decentralized, 
including on a regional basis”. Currently there is only one 
house in Syria, the People’s Assembly. 
The idea of having two houses in the parliament in Syria, 
with one devoted to region-based representation, was 
never proposed by any political actor in Syria. It first 
appeared in the Russian-proposed constitution for Syria, 
which was leaked in mid-2016 and was later handed to 
the representatives of the opposition in one of the Astana 
meetings in January 2017. The Russian version suggests 
a region-based assembly which shares legislative power 
with the people’s assembly. In addition to legislative 
power, the region-based assembly would have the power 
to announce presidential elections, hold no confidence 
in the government, and ratify international treaties and 
conventions including agreements granting concessions 
to foreign companies and issuing general amnesties. 
It is suggested that the assembly be constituted by 
representatives of administrative units, but it is not clear 
whether these representatives would be appointed or 
elected and what election laws would apply.
Representation on a regional basis in Syria during or just 
after a conflict could hold its own set of opportunities, 
but could also have serious undesired consequences.
Before 2011, the authority of the Syrian state was 
very centralised. The state’s distribution of economic 
and natural resources was very biased and regionally 
disproportionate. Regions richest in natural resources, 
like the northeast, received very little back from the 
centre and had the lowest development indexes in 
the country. Mayors as well as all important decision 
makers in every region were appointed by Damascus 
and drew their legitimacy from this appointment and 
their relations to the power structure in the capital, 
and not from the local population. Ethnic minorities, 
particularly Kurds, were deprived of their cultural rights 
and many of them were deprived of other essential 
rights, including the right to citizenship. The rule of 
the supposedly secular and Arab Nationalist al-Ba’ath 
party selectively suppressed the expression of ethnic 
and sectarian identities, but at the same time and in its 
attempt to co-opt the local population and compensate 
for its weak legitimacy, it played on identity politics and 
manipulated sectarian and ethnic identities.
Seven years of war led to the fragmentation of the 
state’s centrality and paved the way for the rise of local 
and regional elites. Some areas went completely outside 
government control. The northeast is now governed 
by self-administration authorities, overwhelmingly 
controlled by the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) party, 
and has extended its control to areas taken from IS like 
Al-Raqqa. The USA has strong influence and presence 
in this region. Within this region Kurds are now freely 
practicing their cultural rights and have enjoyed more 
independence, but several reports point out that other 
minorities in these areas have been subjected to 
oppressive practices. The north-west is divided mainly 
between two areas, one directly controlled by Turkey, 
and another, mainly Idlib, controlled by the armed 
Representation on a regional basis in 
Syria during or just after a conflict 
could hold its own set of opportunities, 
but could also have serious undesired 
consequences.  
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opposition and extremist groups with significant Turkish 
influence and armed presence. Although civic local 
administrative councils were formed in Idlib, decision 
making is still dominated by warlords and armed 
actors who have been attempting to mobilise local 
communities with the use of sectarian rhetorical tools. 
Authority has also been fragmented within government-
held areas itself, often leading to the rise of regional and 
local elites. These elites essentially draw their legitimacy 
from pervasive ethno-sectarian rationalities and their 
monopolisation and instrumentalisation of violence, as 
well as their control over the economy. Also, Russia and 
Iran have been able to substantially influence decision 
making within government-held areas, both in the centre 
and in some of the regions. 
Syria is indeed in need of decentralisation, and it has 
been discussed in policy circles and among Syrians as 
an answer to many of the structural problems they have 
experienced and suffered from, both prior to and after 
the uprisings. But there is no consensus among Syrians 
on the level of this decentralisation.
All of this leaves many open questions to be answered 
regarding the proposed region-based representation in 
Syria. Drawing from the experience of other countries 
where similar systems were adopted post conflict, 
there are four main areas of concerns that need to 
be answered in relation to adopting regional-based 
representation in Syria. These are:
1   Could it possibly further entrench social/societal 
divides, along ethno-sectarian fault lines, and reward 
populists who mobilised people during the conflict 
along ethnic and sectarian lines? Could such a 
situation trigger more tension and conflict in the 
future between different areas? 
2   Could it lead to rewarding warlords and violent elites 
and the creation of regional tyrants and oppression of 
the minorities within these regions?
3   Could it be an alternative to power sharing? And 
would such power sharing end the conflict or just 
shift it to a lower level at multiple sites? 
4   Could it entrench external intervention and/or 
nurture/institutionalise local populations’ structural 
dependency on foreign powers/nation-states?
From the session on decentralisation at the Political economy and governance in Syria conference in December 2018.
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Is decentralisation good for development? 
By Professor Jean-Paul Faguet
Professor Jean-Paul Faguet is Professor of the Political Economy of Development at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, and Co-Programme Director of the MSc in Development 
Management. He is also Chair of the Decentralization Task Force at Columbia University’s Initiative 
for Policy Dialogue. He works at the frontier between economics and political science, using 
quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate the institutions and organisational forms that 
underpin development transformations. He has published in the economics, political science, and 
development literatures, including Is Decentralization Good for Development? Perspectives from 
Academics and Policymakers (Oxford, 2015), and Governance from Below: Decentralization and 
Popular Democracy in Bolivia (Michigan), which won the W J M Mackenzie Prize for the best political 
science book of 2012. His current work focuses on historical institutions, inequality and long-term, 
divergent development outcomes in Colombia and Latin America. 
Decentralisation is at the centre of policy reform agenda 
everywhere. For example, Mexico, Egypt, Ghana and India 
all have active decentralisation programmes. The UK and 
USA also have devolution and federalism programmes. 
The World Bank estimated in the year 2000 that 80-100 
per cent of world’s countries were experimenting with 
decentralisation. Since then, new or deepening reforms 
have been announced in Japan, Cambodia, France, 
Turkey, and Kenya, amongst many others.
There are two fundamental sets of considerations  
when we talk about regionalism and designing  
sub-national units.
The first comes from fiscal federalism theory and is 
largely a set of economic considerations about service 
provisions, efficiency and the degree to which services are 
encompassed, or not, within a particular scale of regional 
unit. Fiscal federalism theory states that public services 
with locally specific benefits (such as garbage collection 
or streetlighting) should be pushed down to a very local 
level of provision. Other services, such as education and 
healthcare, should be provided by a higher level. National-
level issues, like defence and monitory policy, should stay 
in the hands of the central government. 
The second stems from more political issues that 
have to do with centrifugal versus centripetal forces, 
that can disaggregate a society or pull it together. The 
argument against decentralisation and federalism is 
that it tends to weaken the state, promote separatism 
and undermine national identity. The question is: will 
decentralisation stoke centripetal or centrifugal forces? 
The key factor in answering this question is the regional 
specificity of elite interests. If coherent regional elites 
exist in a country and have more to gain from secession 
than autonomy, national disintegration is likely.
The question then becomes: when will regional 
elites have incentives to invest in candidates, parties, 
infrastructure and programmes that promote national 
breakup or national unity? For example, campaigning 
may be based on regionalist pride and secession, or 
language and cultural exclusivity – or on improving 
transport and communication links outwards, and 
educational and cultural programmes built on shared 
history and identity.
If coherent regional elites exist in a 
country and have more to gain from 
secession than autonomy, national 
disintegration is likely.  
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But how could decentralisation be designed for unity? 
There are several considerations that could be taken to 
ensure the unity of the state.
1   Reforms that underpin unity by transcending 
boundaries and ways of thinking. The country 
should be decentralised a level beneath its major 
cleavage, such as on the municipalities rather than 
the provinces level. If ethnicities are concentrated 
in regions, then decentralisation should be at the 
municipal level.
2   This would cause municipalities and local 
governments to be identified not with group identity 
or privilege but instead with issues of efficiency and 
service provision. 
3   Complementary reforms can promote a single 
internal market for goods and services, preventing the 
development of elites with region-specific interests. 
16 Faguet, Fox and Pöschl provide examples from Ethiopia, Canada, Spain, and Bolivia.
4   Improved infrastructure and transport links can also 
help integrate people and the economy. Binding a 
country together “from the bottom up” via infrastructure 
and transport leads to economic growth.16
There is a trade-off between the strength of national 
leaders versus the institutional strength of the state. 
A central leader is strong at the expense of the state. 
Decentralisation sacrifices the central government 
leader’s authority in favour of the institutional strength 
of the state.
Voters casting their votes in the local elections in Afreen. Photo source: cantonafrin.com
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Syria’s experience with federalism 
By Dr Zeidoun Al-Zoubi
Syria has experienced federalism twice in its history. The 
first was enacted in the 1920 constitution and lasted for 15 
days. The second lasted for three years and was imposed 
by the French High Commissioner during the French 
Mandate over Syria. The latter failed mainly because of the 
way Syria was seen by Western countries back then. It was 
seen as a set of different factional groups based on sects 
and ethnicities. This led the West to conclude that the 
best way to mitigate conflict between these factions was 
to create boundaries based on sectarian enclaves. This 
was translated into the division of Syria into three parts. 
The model failed in 1925 because of pressure by Syrians 
against such a system. 
What about today? The north western parts of the 
country have called for federalism, mainly campaigned 
for by the Kurdish political parties. But this was rejected 
everywhere else in the country. Some prefer a model of 
decentralisation that increases local decision making 
power, but not to the level of federalism. Until two years 
ago, it was considered blasphemous to discuss federalism 
in Idlib because it was considered national treachery and 
would promote separatism. Now everyone whispers the 
word “federalism” in Idlib because they feel that there 
is no political transition in Damascus and there is no 
democratic power sharing. This led some to look into the 
federal system as a way to gain autonomy and open the 
possibility of aligning the local elites with Turkey rather 
than reintegrating with a centralised authoritarian state.
In brief, decentralisation is strongly tied into the likelihood, 
or not, of having a political solution in Syria. No one can 
anticipate what a federal system will look like in Syria 
before we know what kind of political solution we will have. 
If the political solution is fair and inclusive, everyone will 
be eager to be part of the central state, mainly because no 
one locality has the resources to manage their own locality. 
If the political solution is not inclusive, some parts of Syria 
will be federalised under the influence of foreign countries, 
even if it is only de facto decentralisation. 
Women in Ainjara in the countryside of Aleppo taking part in a campaign to encourage women to participate in the local elections. 
Photo source: geiroon.net
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The Syrian perspective on decentralisation 
By Moutasem Sioufi
Moutasem Sioufi is the Executive Director of The Day After Association (TDA). TDA is an 
independent, Syrian-led civil society organisation working to support democratic transition in Syria. 
Before joining TDA, Moutasem worked as a senior programme manager at Democracy Council, 
implementing a MEPI-funded project to support local councils and civil society organisations in Syria. 
The program aimed at empowering these organisations, helping them to serve their communities, 
and to build their organisational capacity. Between November 2012 and April 2013, Moutasem 
worked as an adviser for Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) leadership. He has been involved in 
civil society activities in Syria since the Damascus spring in 2001 and been involved in nonviolent 
activities that demanded change and freedom in Syria since 2011. Moutasem holds an MSc in 
Management in Construction from Kingston University, London.
In my view, the question of whether or not someone is 
for or against decentralisation or federalism is not the 
right approach to tackling this issue. Decentralisation 
should be thought of in terms of challenges and 
opportunities for the political solution and the 
development of the country. 
If the regime adopts a regional-based representation, 
we will see an abuse and manipulation of power by 
regime associates, which will serve the interests of 
corrupt clientelist networks around the regime. If the 
current status quo continues, we will see the reflection 
of regional and international relations within local 
governance mechanisms. 
But if a genuine political transition takes place, if we 
get a democratic constitution and national dialogue 
is initiated and political/governance arrangements 
are discussed on a national level, we will then see an 
opportunity for civil society and progressive national 
secular parties to play a role. 
A romantic/political wall graffiti in Deraa, South Syria, that reads “Your eyes are like the state; no justice, no mercy and no equality”, 
reflecting local perceptions of the state. 
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Between 24 February and 11 May 2017, we conducted 
a social survey of 1958 respondents at the TDA, asking 
which constitution Syria needed. In the survey we 
asked participants to what degree they supported the 
following statement: “Syria must adopt a decentralised 
political system based on granting broad administrative 
powers to local authorities”. 42.4 per cent of the 
17 The graph was extracted from a report conducted by The Day After under the title “Which Constitution Does Syria Need”.
respondents supported the statement while 35.5 per 
cent opposed it. We then asked those who were in 
favour of that statement “How much power should be 
vested in the local authority in your opinion? From 0 
to 10, where 0 is complete subjugation to the central 
authority, and 10 is complete independence from the 
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The size of the powers that must be in the hands of the local authority (arithmetic mean). Credit: The Day After17.
When segregating the results based on geography, we 
found that only a small percentage of people in regime-
controlled areas supported decentralisation, compared 
with opposition-controlled areas and Syria Democratic 
Forces (SDF)-controlled areas. Furthermore, more than 
half of the respondents rejected the proposal to grant 
SDF-controlled areas a special status of greater authority 
than others. This was supported by about a quarter. 
‘Syria must adopt a decentralised 
political system based on granting 
broad administrative powers to local 
authorities’. 42.4 per cent of the 
respondents supported the statement 
while 35.5 per cent opposed it.  
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From the Q&A session 
Comments by Dr Omar Abdulziz Hallaj: In addition to the 
issue of people not wanting to go back to a centralised 
security system because they’re afraid for their lives, 
there’s been an internal question within the region about 
whether there’s going to be secular or Islamic Sharia 
law in Syria. A substantial part of the conflict emanates 
from this root or rift in envisioning the Syrian governance 
system. The issue of moving into a more centralised 
or decentralised system has been on the table since 
the 1920 constitution. Back then, everybody agreed 
to a secular constitution. This was in part to repel one 
of France’s justifications to uphold their mandate over 
Syria (ie, that they would guarantee a secular mode of 
governance). The federal system they proposed back 
then was one that assuaged minorities’ fears. Ever 
since, we’ve been moving away from that ideal. Islamic 
law was part of the 1950 constitution. This is one of 
the dimensions of the question on centrality versus 
decentralisation in Syria. 
The other dimension is the division of resources. On 
average, the central government in Syria has been 
spending roughly $1,000-1,500 per capita annually 
on governorates like Damascus, Lattakia and Tartus. 
In places like Deir Ez-Zour, al-Hasakeh and Dar’a, the 
Government spends an average of $200 per capita 
per year.
Now, with the conflict, there’s also a security aspect to 
the question. People are generally afraid to go back to 
being governed by Damascus without guarantees. So it’s 
more of a question of trust and guarantees than on the 
architecture of the state itself. 
Put together, we have two main considerations. We 
could have eight or nine administrative units, which 
would produce a federal system of a different type even 
if the country is not federalised. The government has 
been proposing, in the regional planning commission, 
to somehow reduce governorate authorities to purely 
administrative ones and lead development on a regional 
level. They proposed seven regions in Syria.
Alternatively, we can imagine the reverse: a highly 
centralised system with a lot of decentralised local 
powers where we end up with about 25 governorates. 
Between the two (seven regions or 25 regions) there’s 
a completely different political economy at play. 
Fundamentally, these are the questions that we have 
to discuss, because what is currently being defined 
as democratic self-administration is going to have to 
negotiate within these lines. 
Q:   In Syria, resources are not equally divided across 
the region. If we have decentralisation, does that 
pose a risk in instigating inter-regional conflicts 
over resources? Fiscal policies, I think, will not be 
managed on a central level, so how will taxes be 
distributed across each region? 
 Answer from JP Faguet: Fiscal distribution 
of resources is an issue of continuing friction 
in almost all countries with some level of 
decentralisation. The main problem is when 
resources are distributed in a politicised manner. 
Resources should be distributed unequally 
or asymmetrically because they need to be 
distributed with respect to the cost of providing a 
more equal set of services for all citizens. Costs 
will typically be higher in rural dispersed areas 
with more difficult geographies than in more 
densely populated areas like Damascus where the 
cost per person, for providing sewage or water 
etc, is relatively lower on a per-person basis.
 Separately from that, cities tend to produce more 
fiscal resources that then need to be redistributed 
so that services can be provided elsewhere. So 
service provision should be unequal but it should 
be seen to be unequal in ways that respond to 
technical, geographic and other criteria as well  
as fairness.
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 One of the main difficulties in this is that 
different regions and cities within a country are 
disproportionately able to raise their own fiscal 
resources and then fund the services they have 
to provide. So there have to be transfers, both 
vertically (from the national government) and 
horizontally (between rich and poor cities and 
regions). If that’s seen to be done in a way that 
supports more equal access to goods/services 
and hence more equal democratic rights, that’s 
easier to defend. 
Q:  Do you think humanitarian/developmental aid 
has a particular role to play that would be more 
supportive of governance in Syria, with particular 
regard to decentralisation? 
 Answer from JP Faguet: Aid can be very important, 
especially in a period of transition. It can help 
generate the design of a fiscal federalist system. In 
a period of transition, foreign aid can pump lots of 
money into the economy to help provide services 
in a way that helps stitch the country together.
 The example of Ethiopia is germane. DFID is the 
lead agency, with the participation of the World 
Bank and the African Development Bank and other 
agencies, in the biggest aid-finances sub-national 
investment programme in the world. They’re 
pumping one billion dollars a year into sub-national 
investment in education, health, agriculture and 
roads. This has been tremendously successful and 
even more successful than centralised investment 
was before this programme began. The money  
is being used more efficiently than earlier because 
there are a lot of everyday efficiencies that can  
be gained when resources are controlled by  
local government. 
Q:   You mentioned an inclusive state, I presume by that 
you mean an inclusive centralised state. What will 
that look like? 
 Answer from Z. Zoubi: The best thing we could 
see right now is through the constitutional 
committee. That’s the only opportunity we have 
and is in itself a dream. Initially, everyone thought 
that Resolution 2254 was the solution, now it’s 
only a small part of it. 
Girl from Raqqa in an internal camp in the countryside of Raqqa. Picture credit: Abood Hamam.
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The Kurdish question in Syria; who represents Kurds?
By Dr Mohamad Hasan
Dr Mohamad Hasan is a legal consultant in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, with more than 13 
years of legal experience in the Middle East and Europe. Mohamad often holds lectures in KRG, 
particularly in Cihan University, on the constitutional systems in both Iraq and Syria. Mohamad 
holds a PHD from the University of Pantheon-Assas Paris II (the Sorbonne University in Paris) with 
a dissertation entitled “Iraq and Kurdistan: The Genesis and the challenges and prospects of the 
federal constitutional system”. 
When addressing the Kurdish question in Syria, we often 
talk about a singular “Kurdish cause”. Is it an accurate 
depiction of the issue at hand, or is it a more general 
question regarding minority rights in Syria? The former 
depiction risks viewing it as a case of exception that has 
to do with Kurds themselves, rather than approaching 
it in a way that underlines chauvinistic state policies 
that have disenfranchised all ethnic minorities, albeit 
disproportionately. The solution differs according to 
how we view and approach this. 
I will start with a general historic overview of Kurds 
in Syria, with a focus on Nasserite policies during the 
United Arab Republic and the 1962 population census, 
before delving into the different structures and Kurdish 
political movements that emerged in Rojava after the 
2011 uprising. 
Historic overview 
Kurds have experienced differential suffering during 
their presence in Syria, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The paper, 
however, will mainly focus on Kurds residing within 
Syria’s national boundaries. 
Following independence from the French, Syria 
experienced a series of military coups in which ethnic-
based nationalist discourses were instrumentalised 
in desperate attempts to gain legitimacy. Kurds 
disproportionately suffered from this. 
Several problems arose following Syria’s unification with 
Egypt under the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. 
Although Nasser came to be known as a “friend of Kurds”, 
this only applied to Iraqi Kurds. Kurds in Syria, on the other 
hand, were prohibited from speaking their language in 
public or formally teaching it. Some were even too afraid 
to speak Kurdish in their own homes. This was paralleled 
with harsh restrictions and suppressions of any form of 
Kurdish cultural and/or political activities and organising. 
A crowd celebrating the Kurdish new year of Newroz in Derbassiya, March 2016. Credit: Andrea DiCenzo, Al Jazeera. 
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The 1962 census
The special red identity card issued for ajanib al-Hasakah (those 
who have been deprived of citizenship).
During the period that followed the breakdown of the 
UAR, both before and shortly after al-Ba’ath took power, 
Kurds suffered from state policies in unprecedented 
ways. In 1962, a study was commissioned by 
Mohammad Taleb Hilal, head of the Political Security 
branch at the time, on the region of al-Jazira18. The 
study, which was on the application of Decree No. 93 of 
23 August 1962, concluded that the presence of Kurds 
in Syria posed a threat to Syria’s national security and 
Arab identity. To counter this, the study put forth a series 
of policy recommendations, including to [1] effectively 
change the demographics of Syria’s al-Jazira region 
in the favour of ethnic Arabs, [2] economically weaken 
or disenfranchise the Kurds, [3] spread illiteracy and 
ignorance among Kurdish communities, [4] appropriate 
the Kurdish identity and co-opt it within the larger “Arab” 
identity, and [5] erode their ethnic specificities and limit 
or discourage their presence in Syria. 
18 Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) published a detailed report titled “Syrian Citizenship Disappeared: How the 1962 Census destroyed stateless 
Kurds’ lives and identities” that, in addition to documenting state policies related to the denaturalisation of Syria’s Kurds, incorporates testimonies 
from al-Maktumeen (ie, those who were denaturalised as a result of the census).
19 At least 10 Kurds were killed during every Newroz celebration until 1988.
20 There have been no official estimates of al-Maktumeen. However, an STJ report states that “according to unofficial statistical data, the 1962 census 
created at least 75,000 maktumeen out of a total of 120 to 150 thousand stateless at the time. The number of ajanib (foreigners) exceeded half a 
million as of 2011”.
After al-Ba’ath took over, these recommendations were 
translated into actual policy programmes, summarised 
here: [1] stripping large swathes of the Kurdish populace 
of their Syrian nationalities and considering them 
foreigners in their own land, in accordance with the 
1962 census, [2] state appropriation of Kurds’ fertile 
lands under the guise of land reforms, [3] resettling Arab 
tribes in Kurdish-majority areas, particularly along the 
banks of the Euphrates river, [4] Arabising the names 
of Kurdish towns, villages and cities, [5] significantly 
hampering Kurds’ ability to participate in political life 
(to nominate themselves into parliament or public 
offices, for instance), [6] prohibiting all Kurdish cultural 
celebrations19, [7] considering the Kurdish language and 
culture as threats to national security, and [8] detaining 
several Kurds and transferring them to State Courts 
under accusations of “conspiring against the nation”. 
The 1962 census led to the denaturalisation of almost 
120,000 Syrian Kurds at the time. However, the number 
was estimated to be approximately 400,000 in 2011 
since neither the first nor second generation descendants 
of al-Maktumeen received Syrian citizenship20. This is 
despite the fact that according to article 3 of the Syrian 
citizenship law, anyone residing within Syrian territories 
has a right to citizenship so long as his/her father is 
Syrian, or both their parents are stateless.
Post-2011
Following the 2011 uprisings, Kurdish participation in 
the popular movement was through youth movements 
and coordination committees and later through Kurdish 
political parties. Kurdish nationalist political parties 
organised themselves under the banner of the Kurdish 
National Council (KNC) while anti- or non-nationalist 
political parties established the Rojava Assembly. 
Kurdish demands evolved in several phases. At the very 
beginning, demands exclusively targeted democratic 
transition. Later they encapsulated political, economic 
and constitutional reforms that would constitutionally 
guarantee their essential citizenship rights. 
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Afterwards, and due to several factors beyond the 
scope of this paper, Kurdish opposition voices started 
calling for the toppling of the regime and then for self-
determination. The latter was broadly identified as a 
call for the establishment of political and administrative 
autonomy within the framework of Syrian territorial unity 
and sovereignty. Both political currents demanded a 
federal state, but the specificities between them hugely 
varied. KNC’s calls for federalism, for instance, were 
loaded with nationalistic undertones. 
The KNC aligned itself with the Damascus Declaration 
opposition early in the uprisings and later joined both the 
Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Syrian Coalition. 
KNC members were represented in the Higher Negotiation 
Committee and were therefore represented in the Geneva 
talks. Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat‎ (PYD), on the other hand, 
politically broke away from any form of nationalist and 
considered KNC’s politics to be a primary cause behind 
Kurds’ historic marginalisation. PYD refused the concept 
of the nation-state and put forth the Öcalanist notion of a 
“democratic nation” instead. 
In 2013, self-administration units were established in three 
cantons (Afrin, Kobane and al-Jazira). Each canton has its 
own judicial and legislative councils as well as an executive 
body. Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) and Yekîneyên 
Parastina Jin (YPJ) were established as the military arms 
of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS)21 
while the Asayesh were established as an internal policing 
21 Or the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES) since September 2018. 
force. It was only in 2016, however, that DFNS was 
publicised as the governing body of northern Syria, with its 
own constitution.
Independent Kurdish figures and many civil society 
activists on the other hand, were able to distance 
themselves from partisan politics, but were not organised 
under any unified body. They bore the brunt of political 
polarisation and the lack of political clarity. Instead, they 
put their efforts into advocacy, civil society work, and 
human rights defence as a means of protecting the 
individual and collective rights of Syria’s ethnic minorities. 
Those independents, mainly composed of non-partisan 
activists, civil society representatives, technocrats, and 
human rights advocates, generally agree on a number 
of supra-constitutional principles. These are: the unity of 
Syria, Decentralised state, gender quotas, secularism, the 
separation of powers, the sovereignty and impartiality of 
the judicial system, and the granting of essential rights to 
all of Syria’s societal components and minorities.
Syria is a country with a diverse and enriching array of 
cultures, languages, confessional beliefs and ethnicities. 
The inauguration of any exclusionary regime is detrimental 
to its social cohesion. We must therefore hold an approach 
that does away with exclusivist ideologies, whether based 
on ethnicity or religion. Instead we should rely on a unifying 
national framework to revive Syria’s social fabric on the 
bases of diversity.  
Summary of the Q&A session
Dr Hasan was asked about the historic origin of Kurds in Syria, ie whether Kurds have historically 
resided within the historical boundaries of Syria or have migrated towards the end of the 20th century 
to Syria from Turkey as a result of PKK’s armed strife with the Turkish state. Such an argument has 
recurrently been used to question Kurds’ indigeneity within the region.
The question was answered by both Dr Hasan and a conference participant. Both answers refrained 
from providing an elaborate historical account of Kurdish presence within the modern boundaries of 
Syria in order to avoid controversy but also due to the limited time available. Instead, their arguments 
were premised around the futility of questions around ethnic originality, particularly when it comes 
to a country whose borders were demarcated by foreign powers less than one hundred years ago. 
Examples of the displacement of Assyrians, Armenians and some Arab tribes into Syria in the early 
and mid-20th century were given as proof that Syria’s demographics have always been fluid and that 
therefore any question of indigeneity is bound to be empirically void.
The debate ended with a plea to arrive at a conclusion that whoever is residing within Syrian borders 
has a right to the same citizenship, political participation and economic entitlement as any other 
citizen residing within the country. 
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The political economy of local elections in Syria
Summary by the report editorial team of a presentation given by Dr Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj 
Examining and assessing local or national elections in Syria 
from the perspectives of democracy or fair representation is 
insufficient. In Syria, the main function of local and national 
elections is to build and empower a patronage network for 
the regime. Understanding how these elections function 
can provide insight into the kind of political economy 
that is being fostered and the key actors on the local and 
national scenes. Often, these elections are strategically used 
to distribute key people to ensure a balance of different 
communitarian concerns, sectarian representation and 
social orders, as well as to empower people who are closer 
and more loyal to the government. 
A deeper grasp of the current status of elections, at the 
national and sub-national levels, and how they might affect 
future agreements is important. The UN Security Council 
Resolution 2254 includes elections as one of four elements 
that will define the way forward for a political solution. 
To understand local elections in Syria, we need to understand 
that the central government’s current annual expenditure is 
only $0.5 billion, a significant drop in comparison with the 
$17 billion national budget for 2011. This low spending at the 
local level is an indicator that local councils are not perceived 
by the central government as local entities responsible for 
allocating resources at the local level. 
A high percentage of spending was directed to line ministries, 
which are supervised and largely controlled by governors. 
Therefore, the political economy at the governorate level is 
significantly more important than the local level. 
According to 2011 figures, Syria’s national budget was 
unevenly spent. Some communities were receiving 
substantially more than others on a per capita basis (as 
shown below). In terms of gross amount, the governorate of 
Aleppo might seem to be receiving a lot of money. However, 
with a population of 5.5m people, it received the least 












Total and per capita distribution of the independent provincial budgets in Syria in 2010. Source: Ministry of Local Administration and 
Central Bureau of Statistics.
To some extent, the job of local governance bodies is to 
encourage limited access to state formality. The role of 
local governance, through elections, was to uphold and 
entrench the local gatekeepers that enable this kind of 
access to the formal economy. 
It is very important to examine the administrative 
distribution of local councils, because in 2011 certain 
gerrymandering and demographic shifts were carried 
out in a way that jeopardise the credibility of any future 
elections (See the figure on “Population distribution 
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Population distribution before the issuing of law 107/2011. Credit: Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj.







Distribution of Populations as per Ministerial Decree 1378/2011. Credit: Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj.
The governorate of Aleppo, for example, has 5.5m 
people with roughly more than 20 cities, 111 towns, 
and very few townships. The governorate of Lattakia, 
meanwhile, has about one quarter of Aleppo’s’ 
population, with four cities, proportionately similar to 
Aleppo, and 90 townships. Therefore, the distribution 
of administrative favors went to every corner and every 
village in Lattakia, whereas in Aleppo, rural areas were 
lumped into the urban areas.
Even though law 107 was supposed to broaden local 
authority, the actual impetus of the law was undermined 
through the administrative distribution of local 
councils. One of the main innovations was to ensure 
that communities had elected members representing 
them at a local level. The government went in and 
nullified that after the law was issued, by removing this 
advantage and lumping many of the rural areas across 
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Local governance structure in Kurdish-dominated self-administration areas. Credit: Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj.
The political economy of patronage in Syria is a 
complex web based on distributing government 
favor among national elites rather than at local levels. 
These favours include access to permits, access to 
recognition, or even getting an NGO official license. All 
of these could be seen as part of the kind of favoritism 
the system has created. 
In contrast, in opposition-held areas where elections 
were relatively more democratic, the national-level 
patronage system has been disrupted and replaced 
by localised patronage networks controlled by armed 
actors. This has crippled civic actors, who were 
supposed to be the bearers of a new democracy and 
limited their access. In one case, where donor funds 
were directed to supporting very localised actions 
rather than supporting territorial ones, this further 
disempowered local civic actors and left territorial 
influence and control to armed groups.
The situation is similar in Kurdish-held areas, even 
though their system is considered more transparent. 
The people who end up being nominated to these 
elections are selected by the Movement for a 
Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) political coalition, which 
is controlled by the Democratic Union Party (PYD). They 
have managed to create some sort of balance between 
different communitarian groups, and the leadership of 
TEV-DEM decide which of these selected players get 
to enter which layer of the system. Their canton-based 
governance system has been recentralising after they 
issued several directives which reversed the power 
they put into the hands of local councils back into a 
centralised system dominated by the PYD. 
What are considered to be good governance measures 
in opposition-held areas are not considered the same by 
local communities. These communities look at different 
aspects of what they consider relevant for legitimacy 
and governance, such as government accountability, 
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For example, the city of Aleppo is divided on social, 
sectarian, religious, and ethnic bases. The al-Ba’ath 
party has always taken advantage of these divisions by 
creating an election ticket (list) which reflect most of these 
identities in addition to clientelist loyalty to the governor, 
the al-Ba’ath party chief and/or intelligence branches. 
Consequently, the current electoral system of single-district 
simple-majority would always guarantee that the al-Ba’ath 
list will win the elections. At the same time, a different 
electoral system, such as single-district proportional 
majorities, would also ensure the likelihood that al-Ba’ath 
win elections because the party leadership decides who 
runs against them in the other tickets or lists.
Even in a post-conflict situation, the proportional system 
will not be an advantage to the opposition parties because 
they lack the political machinery and financial resources 
to win elections. In Syria, there are 15,000 voting centres 
for national elections. Opposition parties would need 
10 volunteers for each centre, which means an army of 
150,000 volunteers. This requires a lot of financial and 
logistical support. As a comparison, local elections in 
Lebanon cost approximately $1 billion for a country with 
only four million citizens. With Syria’s larger population, 
local elections would greatly surpass this amount, with 
some estimates suggesting they might reach between two 
to three billion dollars.
Mapping of the flow of power and legitimacy within state institutions and communities on the local and national levels.  
Credit: Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj. 
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Local elections in post-conflict Syria 
By Mazen Gharibeh
Mazen Gharibeh is a research associate at the Department of International Development at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, working on analysing conflict drivers and public 
authority in Syria. He is also a senior governance advisor, currently advising the Syrian Interim 
Government (SIG) on building their capacity in good governance mechanisms and developing their 
policies and strategies as part of an EU-funded and GIZ-run project.
Mazen’s background combines academic research with policy work and strong grassroots 
experience: he is a co-founder of Homs Local Administrative Council and worked with numerous 
local councils in Syria on how to increase their legitimacy. He is widely connected in all these three 
levels. He published on local governance and the perception of legitimacy in Syria. Previously he 
worked as a lecturer at Brno University and Palacký University in the Czech Republic, as a governance 
advisor with Adam Smith International and as a consultant for several international think tanks.
Despite the regional and international projections of the 
Syrian conflict, the core of the conflict remains deeply 
rooted at the local level. The local dynamics of the 
ongoing Syrian conflict and the newly emerged social 
norms and governance structures have played a major 
role in defining and directing this conflict on the ground. 
They have created a new socio-political identity of the 
Syrian state and shaped the local debate to include 
pressing issues such as: decentralisation, identity 
politics, civil society and social accountability. Most of 
the warring parties in Syria have realised at an early 
stage the significance of demonstrating responsive 
and effective governance structures for the purpose of 
legitimising their existence. 
However, the importance of these local governance 
structures has not been properly reflected within 
the internationally-backed peace processes – such 
as Sochi, Geneva and Astana – and this will have 
catastrophic consequences on reconstruction and 
the restoration of the deeply fragmented Syrian social 
structures. These newly born localities must be the 
primary milestones of any future peace talks and the 
main carriers of any possible political agreement.
The most applicable way to work towards this goal, 
from a local perspective, is the careful planning of free, 
fair, transparent and representative local elections with a 
clear legal framework that guarantees judicial and social 
accountability towards the elected local structures.
The evolution of local administration laws  
in Syria 
Local administration modalities in Syria have passed 
through two major benchmarks; the 1971 law of local 
administration (Legislative Decree No.15 for 1971), and 
the modified version of that law (Legislative Decree 
No. 107 for 2011), or what is commonly known as law 
107. There are only a few minor cosmetic differences 
between the two laws, despite the considerable time 
interval between them.
Law 107 did not offer any meaningful changes to the 
central apparatus of the al-Ba’ath state. It promised to 
delegate additional administrative and fiscal powers 
from the central government to the elected councils. 
However, these changes should have been clarified in the 
National Decentralisation Plan, which should have been 
created by the High Council of Local Administration. This 
council was never created, and these changes were never 
introduced. As a result, the situation remained largely the 
same as before and all the decision-making power for 
political, security, judicial, and budgetary affairs remained 
centralised in Damascus. 
Law 107 did not offer any meaningful 
changes to the central apparatus of the 
al-Ba’ath state.  
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Campaign posters in a square in Damascus. Credit: Myriam Youssef.
Almost all the crucial delegated responsibilities are 
concentrated in the hands of Damascus-appointed 
governors. These governors are appointed by a 
presidential decree based on recommendations of the 
intelligence branches and have the legal right not to be 
accountable to traditional judicial institutions.
Major issues related to local elections law
The voting rights for internally displaced persons (IDPs):
• Voting rights in Syria are based on electoral localities, 
which are associated with civil registries – birth 
registrations. Only citizens who were born in the 
administrative unit are eligible to vote for its council.
• Participating in local elections requires  
physical presence at the election centre during  
the elections period.
• As a result, permanent or temporary residents 
(including IDPs) who are unable to safely return to 
their original place of residence are deprived from 
their right to freely participate in local elections.
Women’s representation:
• The Syrian Law of General Elections has neglected 
to allocate any kind of gender quotas for any type 
of public elections. 
• The law of general elections and the law of local 
administration must ensure that women constitute 
a “critical minority” of at least 35 per cent of all 
local administrative council (LAC) members, 
by introducing a mandatory electoral gender 
quota whereby a minimum of 40 per cent of the 
candidates on the electoral lists would be women, 
and/or imposing quotas (35 per cent) of reserved 
seats for women in all LACs.
Election observation and administration:
• Syria’s elections have been coercive and 
predetermined by al-Ba’athist Party leaders and 
high-ranking intelligence officers in Damascus.
• There is no public trust in the state’s legal and 
judicial institutions. The institutions’ integrity and 
capacity to observe elections is questionable. 
• In the foreseeable future, the Syrian judicial system 
will not be able to handle such a task.
• Therefore, international election observation 
missions are needed – such as EU EOMs and OSCE 
– which would be equipped with a full mandate 
(similar to the 1997 Municipality Elections of BiH).
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The 2018 local council elections in Syria and their implications 
By Myriam Youssef
Myriam Youssef is a Syrian journalist based in Damascus. Working as a freelance journalist for 
around three years, she focused on social and humanitarian aspects of the Syrian war, and she 
reported related stories for local and Arab media outlets. In addition, and in the past year, she has 
been working on social and cultural research with a number of Syrian and Lebanese institutions.
Last September, municipality elections were held in the 
government-held areas in Syria based on a presidential 
decree issued by the Syrian president. These elections 
should have taken place at the beginning of 2016, when 
the term of the previously elected local councils ended. 
However, the Syrian government decided to extend the 
term of the councils, under the pretext that elections 
could not be carried out in the midst of a war on 
terrorism, despite the fact that parliamentary elections 
were in fact carried out as planned in 2014. 
I present here a summary of the local council electoral 
process in Syria in September 2018, based on field 
research conducted during each stage of the elections. 
The full research is published in Youssef et al., 2019.
Main findings 
• The total number of candidates for these local 
elections was 41,482 for a total of 18,478 seats. 
The majority of candidates (70 per cent) were from 
al-Ba’ath Party or part of the al-Ba’ath-led National 
Progressive Front. 
 
University students queue to cast their votes at the Student’s Residence at Damascus University. Source: Social Media.
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University students queue to cast their votes at the Student’s Residence at Damascus University. Source: Social Media.
• The remaining (30 per cent) of candidates, can 
be categorised into three groups: businesspeople 
or those backed by construction and holding 
companies; candidates who were driven by a 
particular sectarian or geographical affiliation; and 
candidates who believed they had the capacity to 
effect change. These were mostly those who in the 
preceding years had entered civil work of some kind. 
• The number of candidates per number of seats had 
in fact reduced in comparison to previous elections, it 
went from 3.3 in 2007 to 2.4 in 2011 to 2.2 in 2018.
• Civil society actors and figures did not noticeably 
appear or participate in the electoral process, 
except for some public awareness campaigns 
on electoral rights and local administration law, 
commonly known as law 107. The main reason of 
their abstention from participation was because 
most of them saw these elections as nothing more 
than an appointment process or merely celebratory 
posturing with no real impact. 
• Field-level observations suggested a low 
representation of young candidates compared to 
those aged 40 and above. This was especially due 
to many young men between the ages of 25 and 
50 having left the country to avoid detention and 
military service.
• Female representation in the nomination process 
appeared to be relatively low. Based on field 
observations, the highest estimate would not exceed 
eight per cent, significantly lower than the official 
announcements by the government and other state-
run media outlets.
• The election campaigns were extremely modest and 
rare, limited to a few city centres, which poses the 
question of how serious these elections were and 
whether they were simply a posturing exercise for the 
acquisition of specific political and economic gains.
• In Ghouta, one of the areas taken by the regime 
in 2018, the signs of the nomination and election 
processes were few and far between. There was 
hardly any electioneering witnessed, nor were any 
independent candidates observed.
• In Raqqa and Idlib, special election centres were set 
up for them in Hama province. Our field observations 
witnessed low levels of nomination, particularly of 
women, in the lists of these two provinces, which 
also led to tens of withdrawals of nominations which 
happened a few days before the election. 
• Al-Hasakah province witnessed mass withdrawals 
against the backdrop of detentions of tens of 
candidates by the security forces of the Partiya 
Yekîtiya Demokrat‎ (PYD) and the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF), which refused to hold elections for 
the Syrian government in their areas of control. This 
was reflected starkly on polling day, with the electoral 
process only taking place in the security square 
which was under the control of Syrian government 
forces. The rural centres were absent from the 
electoral process completely, out of fear of the 
security forces of the PYD and SDF armed groups. 
• The government stated that the turnout had been 56 
per cent of eligible voters, approximately 16,300,000 
people. This is significantly higher than what was 
observed through field observations, one-on-one 
interviews, and media reports, which cite voter 
participation as being poor in some areas and almost 
non-existent in others.
• Field-level observations and face-to-face interviews 
with around 50 people (from Damascus, rural 
Damascus, Tartus and Homs) revealed a 
sense of apathy and a low turnout to the polls, 
as a consequence of the despair felt with the 
predetermined nature of the results. As a result, 
turnout to the polls in the different Syrian towns and 
cities was poor.
• Most of the voters were state employees or students 
who were instructed by their employer or university 
to go to the polls or were friends and family of the 
candidates themselves. 
Most of the voters were state employees 
or students who were instructed by 
their employer or university to go to the 
polls or were friends and family of the 
candidates themselves.  
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Campaign posters in a square in Damascus. Credit: Myriam Youssef.
Conclusion and recommendations
Local elections as a political message and a 
preparatory measure for the reconstruction phase: 
There are several reasons for the regime’s determination 
to hold local elections at this particular time. Perhaps 
the most important are: 
• The elections can be seen as a political gain which 
in turn allows for the consolidation of field-level 
gains secured by the Syrian regime in the battles of 
Ghouta and Dara’a.
• Law 107 gave the local councils some sort of local 
authority over some aspects of the economy and 
construction investments, and thus the elected 
councils will have a strong role in the upcoming 
reconstruction phase, with regard to both planning 
and implementation. It is important therefore 
for the regime to ensure that members of these 
councils are strong supporters.
• Similarly, law 10 allows for the introduction of 
new “redevelopment” areas. It also gives the 
executive office within the administrative unit 
wide-reaching powers to plan and implement these 
new “redevelopment” areas. Therefore, it was very 
important to elect new local councils to start to 
apply this law.
The public perception towards local elections: 
Through face-to-face interviews and field visits, the 
general impression of citizens regarding local elections 
can be summarised as follows: there is a big loss 
of confidence in the overall system of governance 
including the regime and its laws; an increasing level 
of mistrust in the entire legal and judicial system; a 
significant spread of a sense of futility; and a high 
awareness that the electoral process in Syria is merely a 
mockery of elections. 
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Female candidate poster in the city of Damascus. Credit: Myriam Youssef.
Policy implications: 
• Constitutional and legal changes are a necessary 
but insufficient condition for democratic transition 
in Syria. Any meaningful political transition 
process will indeed require substantial changes in 
constitutional and legal frameworks and should 
be based on electoral processes at several levels. 
But these amendments and procedures alone will 
remain futile and could end up as a facade for the 
authoritarian regime, if not accompanied by other 
conditions and measures. 
• Besides legal changes, real change requires 
actions that restore confidence in the overall 
system of governance at all levels. Several 
insurance policies are needed for the Syrians 
to believe in any legal change and to be more 
likely to comply with it and thus give it meaning 
or legitimacy. What is needed is: first, wide 
consultation and participation in the construction 
of these laws; second, for Syrians to have 
confidence that these laws and procedures, such 
as elections, are designed to serve the public 
interest; and third, that the process should be as 
inclusive as possible.
• A genuine democratic process of change in Syria 
also requires a structural change in the political 
economy that allows the dismantling of the 
relationship between power and money, that opens 
for all the possibility of equal and fair participation 
and benefit from the process of development and 
reconstruction, and that allows citizens to exercise 
their supervisory and monitory role in a manner 
protected by law.
• The increase in the proportion of female 
breadwinners in Syria and their increased 
participation in the labour market in Syria presents 
another reason for the calling for quotas for 
women in elections at all levels to ensure their fair 
representation. Increasing their representation 
is also an important entry point for changing the 
political economy structure of the local councils, 
thus weakening the networks of private interests 
and reducing corruption, especially since these 
networks are usually dominated by men. It is 
important to note that it is not enough just to 
allocate a quota to women to encourage them 
to participate in the elections and to run for 
them. Procedures and programmes of political 
empowerment and capacity building for women 
are also required.
• Certainly, the process of change in Syria will not be 
easy and will take a long time, but not putting the 
process of change on the right track from the outset 
will only ensure progress in the wrong direction.
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Documenting human rights abuses in Syria: Gaps and ways  
of addressing them
Summary by the report editors of the presentation given at the conference by Dr Iavor Rangelov and Sema Nassar
Sema Nassar is a Syrian researcher, documenting violence against women, with a particular 
interest in evaluating data on arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances in Syria. This 
involves collecting and analysing relevant information. Sema has organised several training 
programmes for a group of field researchers to provide them with the requisite technical skills 
in documenting and monitoring sexual and gender-based violence within Syria, as well as 
providing advice to local and international organisations in this field. 
Sema participated in Syria’s in-country consultations for the UK National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace and Security. Sema is the Co-Founder of Urnammu for Justice and Human 
Rights, based in Quebec, Canada. She is also a member of the Working Group on Women’s 
Rights and Gender Equality (GWG).
Dr Iavor Rangelov is Research Fellow at the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit, 
London School of Economics and Political Science. He is Chair of the Executive Board of the 
Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade and Co-Chair of the London Transitional Justice Network. 
His main research interests are in the areas of human rights and security, transitional justice, 
and civil society. His current research examines the shifting resource base of civil society in the 
context of closing civic space globally, with a focus on new forms of activism, philanthropy and 
technology. He is involved in the Syria research stream of the Conflict Research Programme 
at LSE, focusing on war crimes documentation and transitional justice. He is the author of 
Nationalism and the Rule of Law: Lessons from the Balkans and Beyond (Cambridge University 
Press) and co-editor of The Handbook of Global Security Policy (Wiley).
Dr Iavor Rangelov and Sema Nassar presented a 
summary and initial findings of their ongoing research 
project at LSE that seeks to understand how the 
character of documentation of human rights violations 
in Syria might impact transitional justice processes. 
In the case of a large-scale conflict like Syria, the entire 
range of transitional justice instruments will be important, 
including accountability/criminal prosecutions but also 
different forms of restorative justice such as reparations 
and restitution. In Syria, there have been significant 
efforts by international actors to document violations and 
atrocity crimes but little effort has been made to assess 
these documentation efforts and identify potential 
gaps and shortcomings that might have significant 
implications for transitional justice. A central aim of 
the project is to assess whether and how civil society 
might be filling these gaps. That means examining the 
documentation work conducted by international actors 
and civil society initiatives and assessing the extent to 
which they can provide a basis for credible and effective 
justice processes.
From the outset, the project detected an overwhelming 
focus, at both international and civil society levels, 
on documentation for accountability/retributive 
justice purposes. For example, instruments such as 
the International Mechanism for Investigation and 
Prosecution, and the International Commission for 
Justice and Accountability, focus on perpetrators 
and preparing cases for prosecution. The character 
of the documentation is aligned with these 
objectives. Moreover, documentation efforts aimed at 
accountability tend to focus primarily on the regime 
and IS, effectively neglecting other non-state actors as 
well as a range of external actors implicated in serious 
violations either directly or through aiding and abetting.   
Rangelov and Nassar emphasised another gap in 
current documentation efforts. By focusing almost 
exclusively on accountability, international actors 
have directed little, if any, attention and resources to 
documentation activities that might support victim-
centred aspects of transitional justice – different 
instruments of restorative justice, from recognition to 
reparation and restitution of land and property. 
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Um Raed stares for long hours into the rubble of her neighbourhood, almost completely in ruins. Um Raed, whose family lived in the 
Palestinian camp of al-Yarmouk for more than 40 years, is among hundreds of thousands whose lives can only be partly revived by 
a comprehensive restorative justice process. Photo credit: Maher al Mounes.
While the project is still ongoing, here are the preliminary 
findings from the data collected in the project so far: 
• The most rigorous and serious human 
rights organisations have focused on using 
documentation to publicise and condemn 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes.
• Lack of access has prevented documentation of 
human rights violations in many areas, especially 
newly “reconciled” areas.
• Some of the smaller civil society groups have 
adopted a more victim-centred approach. However 
their efforts tend to focus more on assisting victims 
and their families, especially detainees and victims 
of sexual violence, rather than documentation. 
Some groups are helping the families of victims to 
organise themselves and strengthen their capacity 
to seek justice themselves. 
• The gaps in documentation often have to do with 
the justice mechanisms that are available. For 
example, the International Envoy can be contacted 
with cases that involve the government, but is not 
able to talk to IS or the rebels. Thus the mechanisms 
in place end up shaping what is documented.
• A recent development is the adoption of a 
protocol for cooperation between the International 
Mechanism and Syrian civil society organisations 
– potentially, steering civil society even further 
towards a focus on accountability.
By focusing almost exclusively on 
accountability, international actors 
have directed little, if any, attention and 
resources to documentation activities that 
might support victim-centred aspects of 
transitional justice.  
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The Civil Society Support Room
The Civil Society Support Room (CSSR), established by 
the Office of the Special Envoy to Syria under de Mistura’s 
leadership in 2016, can be seen as a positive process in the 
context of failed initiatives and negative developments at 
the political level. We hear in this section about CSSR from 
three different perspectives. First, an academic perspective, 
with the presentation of the preliminary findings of an LSE 
research project manager in CSSR, next the perspective of 
one of CSSR participant, and finally a member of the UN 
office of the special envoy to Syria team, who has been 
involved from the outset in making CSSR a reality. 
United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura addresses participants and attendees to the Geneva peace talks. A member from 
the Civil Society Support Room and a member of the Women advisory board sitting behind him, February 23, 2017.
Process in its own right; the Syrian CSSR
By Marika Theros
Marika Theros is a governance and human rights expert working at the intersection of public policy, 
academia, civil society and business. She is currently a senior researcher at the Institute for State 
Effectiveness, where she leads their State of the State initiative. Over the last ten years she has 
designed a number of research and dialogue processes in Afghanistan, the Gulf, Lebanon, Europe and 
the Balkans, related to human rights security and justice. Prior to this, she served as a Research Officer 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, a senior human rights consultant for a large 
construction project owner in the Persian Gulf and a senior consultant for the Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund. She is currently a board member for the Humanitarian Law Center and the Balkan Forum.
The Civil Society Support Room (CSSR) was initiated by 
active civil society lobbying and a receptive and responsive 
UN Special Envoy, Staffan de Mistura. It is both a physical 
room in Geneva to convene civil society actors from across 
conflict lines, and a space for dialogue, networking and 
advocacy. Compared to other processes for inclusion, 
the CSSR is a new approach to civil society engagement 
in peace-making and has the potential to serve as a 
learning tool for future contexts. Its design as an iterative 
and flexible process, capable of adapting to changing 
conditions on the ground, helped generate a sense of 
ownership from the participants on the design itself. It 
began with 12 participants but has grown to include nearly 
500 civil actors from a range of backgrounds, geographies, 
and expertise. While the majority come from NGOs and 
organised sectors of civil society working on different 
issues, there are also public figures and experts, including 
legal and constitutional experts, university professors, and 
former government advisors.  
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The survey on the CSSR was conducted by a team at 
the LSE Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit, and 
was presented at the conference by one of its members, 
Marika Theros. Ongoing research into the CSSR includes 
individual interviews, focus groups, meetings reports, 
secondary sources, discussions with policy makers 
and media mapping, but the presentation focused on 
initial survey findings. The survey was completed by 103 
participants. It included 28 questions designed to capture 
the impact of CSSR on those who have participated, 
and to elicit their perspectives on its role and how best 
to improve its design. From the background information 
provided by survey participants, we learn that:
• Two thirds were men, and one third were women. 
• Fifty-two per cent were over 40, but only 16 per cent 
were under the age of 30. 
• The majority of participants came from organised 
sectors of civil society (74 per cent of CSOs), and 
the remainder were individual experts and publicly-
known figures.  
The survey found that participants viewed its potential 
impacts on multiple levels, including on the political 
process, on developments on the ground, and on 
peacebuilding. Participation in the CSSR significantly 
reduced confidence in the political process and its 
negotiating parties. In addition, nearly half did not believe 
that the CSSR influenced the agenda or outputs of 
three intra-Syrian political talks, and not one respondent 
believed it contributed to creating an environment of 
trust among negotiating parties. Positive impact on 
the political process was seen in helping break the 
dichotomous narratives of the Syrian conflict presented 
by negotiating parties and outside actors, often seen in 
black and white sectarian terms. 
Reduced
Increased
Trust, networking, and respect 




Participant views on the impact of their participation in CSSR:
Conﬁdence in political 
talks and negotiating parties
58 per cent strongly 
disagree that the 
participation enhanced 
their trust in negotiating 
parties (only 17 per cent did)     
72 per cent believe more in the 
importance of civil society 
participation in the peace process, 
while 15 per cent do not
52 per cent believe CSSR helped 
break barriers with others from 
different political views
58 per cent believe that CSSR 
expanded networking, while 
27 per cent do not
57 per cent more receptive to 
working across conflict-lines, 
while 22 per cent are not
50 per cent more receptive and 
understanding to different opinions, 
while 30 per cent are not    
47 per cent strongly 
disagree that the 
participation enhanced 
their trust in the political 
process (only 35 per 
cent did)   
Impact of the Civil Society Support Room. Credit: The Conflict Research Programme’s (CRP) Syria Unit.
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the impact of the CSSR on peace talks? 
Helped create an inclusive civic framework through 
which the Syrian CS could play a larger role in the future
Contributed to ending the monopoly of the political
process by only two negotiationg political parties
Was able to communicate the voices and sufferings
of those absented from the peace process
Was able to influence the discourse of the special
envoy and country representatives on Syria
Contributed to facilitating local humanitarian issues and
mediating humanitarian truces through networking in CSSR
CSSR has enhanced public trust
in the peace process
CSSR has had a role in influencing the
agenda and outputs of the talks
CSSR has had a direct and constructive
impact on Track I talks
100%80%60%40%20%0%









Perceptions of participants in the Civil Society Support Room with regards to its impact. Credit: The Conflict Research Programme’s 
(CRO) Syria Unit.
The survey found that the greatest impact of CSSR 
was on civil society itself, breaking stereotypes of the 
“other”, and expanding opportunities for dialogue and 
networking across conflict lines. After participating in 
the CSSR, 74 per cent believe more in the importance 
of civil society in the peace process and 82 per cent 
believed that the CSSR was able to break barriers and 
converging conflicting viewpoints. More than half of 
respondents were more receptive to working across 
conflict lines and to understanding different opinions. 
Through CSSR participation, the survey found that 
nearly 70 per cent viewed the CSSR as creating an 
opportunity for the development of an inclusive Syrian 
civil framework through which civil society can play a 
constructive role in peace and reconstruction.
Negative impact, 
resulting in divergent 
opinions 3.51 per cent
Q: do you think CSSR was able to break barriers and converge conflicting viewpoints?









The most important impact was connecting 
Syrians from different areas and with different 
viewpoints; crystallising CS role in expressing 
people’s interests.  
A participant
We already believed that we had to work with 
civil society across conflict-lines, but we didn’t 
have a way to do so’ a participant.  
A participant
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CSSR impact was more direct on 
humanitarian issues, ceasefires,  
and humanitarian access than on 
political talks.  
A participant
The survey also found that 75 per cent of those under 
40 felt CSSR positively impacted humanitarian action 
on the ground by directly connecting them to the UN’s 
Humanitarian Task Force and to the ISSG ceasefire task 
force. Moreover, it helped thicken civil society’s  
networks across geographies, which, in some, could 
help lend support to humanitarian action by civil  
society themselves. 
41 per cent believe CSSR helped facilitate 
humanitarian action on the ground
BUT
75 per cent of those under 40 felt CSSR positively 









Going forward, nearly 80 per cent believed that, if the 
political talks were to stop, the CSSR would remain an 
important platform for peacebuilding and should continue 
to provide a space for civic actors to engage on important 
issues across the territories and conflict divides, and to 
express the voices of those from their communities. 
Unlike dominant discourses, which express the conflict 
in sectarian terms, participants felt that the selection 
of participants should be value driven and not based 
on notions of representation, or gave equal weight to 
individuals rooted in communities and organised sectors 
of civil society. 
In addition, participants did not believe that it was 
necessary for consensus to be reached on all subjects 
under discussion. Instead, 75 per cent felt that consensus 
should be found on the values and frameworks for 
rebuilding the legitimacy of the state. In this way, civil 
society was about reflecting the diversity of opinions in 
the country and seeking consensus on the foundational 
principles of what the vision for a new Syria might be. In this 
way, CSSR was seen a valuable part of the larger political 
process that should be conceived as a track in its own right. 
Given its impact across different levels, it should continue 
as a key element of a broader political process, and should 
be linked to the UN to help legitimise the role of civil society 
and increase its influence.
What do you think is the most important criteria for selecting CSSR participants (both individuals and organizations)?
Not being involved in in any military activities
Public ﬁgures with wide acceptance among Syrian society
Organisations that are active in areas where Syrians reside
Not being involved in any political organization
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The Syrian Civil Society Support Room – a participant perspective 
Summary by the report editors of the presentation given at the conference by a frequent 
participant in the CSSR
The CSSR is a new approach without precedents. As 
such, it has been a challenging and learning process 
both for the UN and Syrian civil society, and was 
seen one of the newest experiences in engaging civil 
society in peace talks. It evolved from being a room 
for 12 representatives of civil society organisations 
at the beginning to having nearly 500 participants 
today. It was particularly challenging at first for all 
participants to put aside their political positions in 
order to envision together a peaceful future for Syria. 
There was a tendency to blame others for everything 
that has happened. There was also a prevailing 
atmosphere of deep distrust and conspiratorial thinking 
with participants questioning the legitimacy of some 
of the other participants in the room. One of the 
difficulties lay in understanding their ownership of the 
process and their duty as active partners, rather than 
expecting the UN to present them with ready solutions. 
This is necessary both to ensure the success of this 
programme and for future similar programmes to come. 
There are three main challenges: the first stems from 
the wide diversity within the CSSR, with participants 
coming from different backgrounds, areas and political 
views. The second pertains to the communication 
between participants and UN representatives; this 
was subsequently solved by the NGOs who facilitated 
communication. And third is communication with 
the political parties. This is a significant and ongoing 
challenge for the CSSR participants. Women’s 
participation was also a challenge in the beginning but 
was resolved very quickly. In the first CSSR meeting 
there was only one female member in the room. At the 
last meeting in autumn 2018, the ratio of women to 
men was 60 per cent. The member also believes that 
the Syrian military and political class does not approve 
of the CSSR, thinking that political, military and security 
issues are not for civil society to discuss.
One lesson that was learned is that the role of civil 
society is more about monitoring than political 
negotiation, and that it plays an important role in 
holding parties accountable to push forward a peaceful 
agreement. The internal dialogue in the room was very 
rich and succeeded in breaking many barriers. Most 
importantly, and after long meetings and discussions, all 
participants reached a consensus on a set of values and 
on their roles in the room, so that they were an integral 
part of the design of the process. This increased the 
feeling of ownership in the room, and will hold the room 
together for the future and act as a solid base to reach 
further agreement.
Sustainable peace cannot be achieved without involving 
Syrian civil society from the beginning. This is something 
that all participants came to understand. And the role 
of civil society should not only be confined to the UN 
process, but should also extend to other meetings 
in which the future of Syria is being decided, such as 
regional meetings. CSSR has been challenging indeed 
but it is an important space for constructive dialogue that 
needs to be protected and much could be built on it.the i
The internal dialogue in the room 
was very rich and succeeded in 
breaking many barriers... Sustainable 
peace cannot be achieved without 
involving Syrian civil society from the 
beginning.  
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About the process of forming the CSSR, from the UN perspective 
Summary by the report editors of the comments made at the conference by Salvatore Pedulla, 
Senior Political Affairs Officer at the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Syria, in charge of the CSSR.
When appointed by Mr de Mistura, Pedulla was asked 
by the Special Envoy to establish a process that would 
facilitate the inclusion of Syrian women, experts and 
civil society organisations in the UN mediation process. 
The political process in Syria being especially complex, 
de Mistura said such a platform should be flexible, 
gradual, and part of the process of the UN-facilitated 
talks without jeopardising the self-civic nature of the 
space. It has been a challenge but also according to 
Pedulla, one of the most rewarding experiences of his 
UN career.
CSSR started with 12 organisations and has a current 
participation of over 500. The core is NGOs but CSSR 
also includes legal and constitutional experts, university 
professors, local civil initiatives and artists. There is 
a wide range of expertise and backgrounds. There 
is also incredible diversity in terms of the issues the 
organisations focus on, where they are based, etc. This 
diversity is part of the richness CSSR participants bring 
to the political process.
One common interest is the issue of advocacy. Most 
organisations do not have the resources, network or 
access to key international players to get their message 
out. Young organisations mushrooming in the context 
of the conflict do not come with an understanding of 
what a UN mediation process is. Last week 30 of those 
organisations had the opportunity to spend two hours 
speaking to 18 ambassadors about their concerns. The 
government and the opposition never sat in the same 
room together but civil society members, with differing 
opinions, were able to sit together, discuss and conduct 
advocacy with the international community.
Participants gave their expertise to the UN and in some 
cases were able to connect them with the humanitarian 
task force, which in some cases made a real difference 
for people on the ground.
It is a room that is both physical and a space that is 
about dialogue, connecting, networking and advocacy. 
It’s been extraordinary to see the courage, resilience, 
dignity, efforts and generosity of so many Syrians from 
different generations.
The government and the opposition 
never sat in the same room together but 
civil society members, with differing 
opinions, were able to sit together, 
discuss and conduct advocacy with the 
international community.  
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Concluding remarks by Professor Mary Kaldor 
Professor Mary Kaldor is the Director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at LSE and 
Professor of Global Governance. Mary pioneered the concept of new wars and global civil society 
and her work on the practical implementation of human security has directly influenced European 
and national politics. Mary is highly regarded for her innovative work on democratisation, conflict, 
and globalisation. She was a founding member of European Nuclear Disarmament (END), a founder 
and Co-Chair of the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly and a member of the International Independent 
Commission to investigate the Kosovo crisis, established by the Swedish Prime Minister.
Her books include: The Baroque Arsenal, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global 
Era, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War and Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and 
Intervention. She is also the editor and co-author of the annual Global Civil Society Yearbook. Her 
most recent book International Law and New Wars, co-authored with Professor Christine Chinkin, 
was published in May 2017.
In 2003, Mary’s work was recognised with the receipt of Commander of the British Empire (CBE) for 
“services to democracy and global governance”.
While the dominant discourse is to think of war as a 
deep-rooted political contest between two organised 
sides, conference discussions highlighted how the war 
in Syria can be better understood as a new war. This 
kind of war constructs a new social condition in which 
numerous groups benefit economically and/or politically 
from violence rather than from winning or losing. While the 
deep-rooted conflict is between the regime and the people, 
the armed conflict can better be described as a mutual 
enterprise that involves a complex mix of criminality, 
terrorism, and repression fueled by multiple actors with 
stakes in the political economy of conflict. 
Thinking in those terms is useful in answering the two big 
questions that came out of this conflict: has the regime 
won or is it a Pyrrhic victory? And what does that mean 
for the role of outside intervenors? First, if we conceive of 
war as an evolving social process, the regime has inherited 
a new kind of predatory social condition that is vastly 
different from the social order of before. Today, Syria is 
fragmented and controlled by diverse factions, militarised 
and populated by numerous militias. On one hand, we see 
the destruction of human capital, the middle class, the 
educated people, and cultural heritage. On the other is the 
rise of a new business elite associated with the regime and 
the militias, while the people are left poor and devastated 
with children traumatised and out of school.
“Peace players” in the city of Tartus engaging in a civil society run project that mainstreams peacebuilding in basketball.  
Picture credit: Mobaderoon web site.
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The conference and material were funded by a grant from 
LSE’s Department of International Development and the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID); however 
the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK 
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